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Abstract. We introduce refutationally complete superposition calculi for intentional and
extensional clausal λ-free higher-order logic, two formalisms that allow partial application
and applied variables. The calculi are parameterized by a term order that need not be
fully monotonic, making it possible to employ the λ-free higher-order lexicographic path
and Knuth–Bendix orders. We implemented the calculi in the Zipperposition prover and
evaluated them on Isabelle/HOL and TPTP benchmarks. They appear promising as a
stepping stone towards complete, highly efficient automatic theorem provers for full higher-
order logic.
1. Introduction
Superposition is a highly successful calculus for reasoning about first-order logic with equality.
We are interested in graceful generalizations to higher-order logic: calculi that, as much as
possible, coincide with standard superposition on first-order problems and that scale up to
arbitrary higher-order problems.
As a stepping stone towards full higher-order logic, in this article we restrict our atten-
tion to a clausal λ-free fragment of polymorphic higher-order logic that supports partial appli-
cation and application of variables (Section 2). This formalism is expressive enough to permit
the axiomatization of higher-order combinators such as pow : Πα. nat→ (α→ α)→ α→ α
(intended to denote the iterated application hn x):
pow〈α〉 Zero h ≈ id〈α〉 pow〈α〉 (Succ n) h x ≈ h (pow〈α〉 n h x)
Key words and phrases: superposition calculus, clausal lambda-free higher-order logic, refutational
completeness.
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Conventionally, functions are applied without parentheses and commas, and variables are
italicized. Notice the variable number of arguments to pow〈α〉 and the application of h. The
expressiveness of full higher-order logic can be recovered by introducing SK-style combinators
to represent λ-abstractions and proxies for the logical symbols [42, 53].
A widespread technique to support partial application and application of variables in
first-order logic is to make all symbols nullary and to represent application of functions by
a distinguished binary symbol app : Πα, β. fun(α, β)×α→ β, where fun is an uninterpreted
binary type constructor. Following this scheme, the higher-order term f (h f), where f :
κ → κ′, is translated to app(f, app(h, f))—or rather app〈κ, κ′〉(f, app〈fun(κ, κ′), κ〉(h, f)) if
we specify the type arguments. We call this the applicative encoding. The existence of
such a reduction to first-order logic explains why λ-free higher-order terms are also called
“applicative first-order terms.” Unlike for full higher-order logic, most general unifiers are
unique for our λ-free fragment, just as they are for applicatively encoded first-order terms.
Although the applicative encoding is complete [42] and is employed fruitfully in tools
such as HOLyHammer and Sledgehammer [18], it suffers from a number of weaknesses, all
related to its gracelessness. Transforming all the function symbols into constants consider-
ably restricts what can be achieved with term orders; for example, argument tuples cannot
be compared using different methods for different symbols [43, Section 2.3.1]. In a prover,
the encoding also clutters the data structures, slows down the algorithms, and neutralizes
the heuristics that look at the terms’ root symbols. But our chief objection is the sheer
clumsiness of encodings and their poor integration with interpreted symbols. And they
quickly accumulate; for example, using the traditional encoding of polymorphism relying on
a distinguished binary function symbol t [17, Section 3.3] in conjunction with the applicative
encoding, the term Succ x becomes t(nat, app(t(fun(nat, nat),Succ), t(nat, x ))). The term’s
simple structure is lost in translation.
Hybrid schemes have been proposed to strengthen the applicative encoding: If a given
symbol always occurs with at least k arguments, these can be passed directly [47]. However,
this relies on a closed-world assumption: that all terms that will ever be compared arise in the
input problem. This noncompositionality conflicts with the need for complete higher-order
calculi to synthesize arbitrary terms during proof search [12]. As a result, hybrid encodings
are not an ideal basis for higher-order automated reasoning.
Instead, we propose to generalize the superposition calculus to intensional and exten-
sional clausal λ-free higher-order logic. For the extensional version of the logic, the property
(∀x. h x ≈ k x) −→ h ≈ k holds for all functions h, k of the same type. For each logic,
we present two calculi (Section 3). The intentional calculi perfectly coincide with standard
superposition on first-order clauses; the extensional calculi depend on an extra axiom.
Superposition is parameterized by a term order, which is used to prune the search
space. If we assume that the term order is a simplification order enjoying totality on ground
terms (i.e., terms containing no term or type variables), the standard calculus rules and
completeness proof can be lifted verbatim. The only necessary changes concern the basic
definitions of terms and substitutions. However, there is one monotonicity property that is
hard to obtain unconditionally: compatibility with arguments. It states that s′ ≻ s implies
s′ t ≻ s t for all terms s, s′, t such that s t and s′ t are well typed. Blanchette, Waldmann,
and colleagues recently introduced graceful generalizations of the lexicographic path order
(LPO) [20] and the Knuth–Bendix order (KBO) [6] with argument coefficients, but they
both lack this property. For example, given a KBO with g ≻ f, it may well be that g a ≺ f a
if f has a large enough multiplier on its argument.
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Our superposition calculi are designed to be refutationally complete for such nonmono-
tonic orders (Section 4). To achieve this, they include an inference rule for argument con-
gruence, which derives C ∨ s x ≈ t x from C ∨ s ≈ t. The redundancy criterion is defined
in such a way that the larger, derived clause is not subsumed by the premise. In the com-
pleteness proof, the most difficult case is the one that normally excludes superposition at
or below variables using the induction hypothesis. With nonmonotonicity, this approach no
longer works, and we propose two alternatives: Either perform some superposition inferences
into higher-order variables or “purify” the clauses to circumvent the issue. We refer to the
corresponding calculi as nonpurifying and purifying.
The calculi are implemented in the Zipperposition prover [29] (Section 5). We evaluate
them on first- and higher-order Isabelle/HOL [23] and TPTP benchmarks [62,63] and com-
pare them with the applicative encoding (Section 6). We find that there is a substantial
cost associated with the applicative encoding, that the nonmonotonicity is not particularly
expensive, and that the nonpurifying calculi outperform the purifying variants.
An earlier version of this work was presented at IJCAR 2018 [11]. This article extends
the conference paper with detailed soundness and completeness proofs and more explana-
tions. Because of too weak selection restrictions on the purifying variants, our claim of refuta-
tional completeness in the conference version was not entirely correct. We now strengthened
the selection restrictions accordingly. Moreover, we extended the logic with polymorphism,
leading to minor modifications to the calculus. We also simplified the presentation of the
clausal fragment of the logic that interests us. In particular, we removed mandatory argu-
ments. The redundancy criterion also differs slightly from the conference version. Finally, we
updated the empirical evaluation to reflect recent improvements in the Zipperposition prover.
2. Logic
Our logic is intended as a convenient intermediate step on the way towards full higher-
order logic (also called simple type theory) [27, 36]. Refutational completeness of calculi
for higher-order logic is usually stated in terms of Henkin semantics [12, 38], in which the
universes used to interpret functions need only contain the functions that can be expressed
as terms. Since the terms of λ-free higher-order logic exclude λ-abstractions, in “λ-free
Henkin semantics” the universes interpreting functions can be even smaller. In that sense,
our semantics resemble Henkin prestructures [45, Section 5.4]. In contrast to other higher-
order logics [64], there are no comprehension principles, and we disallow nesting of Boolean
formulas inside terms.
2.1. Syntax. We fix a set Σty of type constructors with arities and a set Vty of type
variables. We require at least one nullary type constructor and a binary type constructor
→ to be present in Σty. Types τ, υ of λ-free higher-order logic are either a type variable
α ∈ Vty or of the form κ(τ¯n) for an n-ary type constructor κ ∈ Σty and types τ¯n. Here and
elsewhere, we write a¯n or a¯ to abbreviate the tuple (a1, . . . , an) or product a1×· · · ×an, for
n ≥ 0. We write κ for κ() and τ → υ for→(τ, υ). A type declaration is an expression of the
form Πα¯m. τ (or simply τ if if m = 0), where all type variables occurring in τ belong to α¯m.
We fix a set Σ of symbols with type declarations, written as f : Πα¯m. τ or f, and a set V
of typed variables, written as x : τ or x . To avoid empty Herbrand universes, we require Σ
to contain a symbol with type declaration Πα. α. The sets (Σty,Vty,Σ,V ) form the logic’s
signature. We reserve the letters s, t, u, v, w for terms and x, y, z for variables and write : τ
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to indicate their type. The set of λ-free higher-order terms is defined inductively as follows.
Every variable in X is a term. If f : Πα¯m. τ is a symbol and υ¯m are types, then f〈υ¯m〉 : τ is
a term. If t : τ → υ and u : τ , then t u : υ is a term, called an application. Non-application
terms are called heads. A term is ground if it is built without using type or term variables.
Using the spine notation [26], terms can be decomposed in a unique way as a head t applied
to zero or more arguments: ts1 . . . sn or ts¯n (abusing notation). Substitution and unification
are generalized in the obvious way, without the complexities associated with λ-abstractions;
for example, the most general unifier of x b z and f a y c is {x 7→ f a, y 7→ b, z 7→ c}, and
that of h (f a) and f (h a) is {h 7→ f}.
An equation s ≈ t is formally an unordered pair of terms s and t. A literal is an equation
or a negated equation, written ¬ s ≈ t or s 6≈ t. A clause L1 ∨ · · · ∨ Ln is a finite multiset
of literals Lj. The empty clause is written as ⊥.
2.2. Semantics. A type interpretation Ity = (U, Jty) is defined as follows. The set U
is a nonempty collection of nonempty sets, called universes. The function Jty associates
a function Jty(κ) : U
n → U with each n-ary type constructor κ. A type valuation ξ is
a function that maps every type variable to a universe. The denotation of a type for a
type interpretation Ity and a type valuation ξ is defined by JαK
ξ
Ity
= ξ(α) and Jκ(τ¯)KξIty =
Jty(κ)(Jτ¯ K
ξ
Ity
). Here and elsewhere, we abuse notation by applying an operation on a tuple
when it must be applied elementwise; thus, Jτ¯nK
ξ
Ity
stands for Jτ1K
ξ
Ity
, . . . , JτnK
ξ
Ity
.
A type valuation ξ can be extended to be a valuation by additionally assigning an
element ξ(x) ∈ JτKξIty to each variable x : τ . An interpretation function J for a type in-
terpretation Ity associates with each symbol f : Πα¯m. τ and universe tuple U¯m ∈ U
m a
value J (f, U¯m) ∈ JτK
ξ
Ity
, where ξ is the type valuation that maps each αi to Ui. Loosely
following Fitting [35, Section 2.5], an extension function E associates to any pair of uni-
verses U1, U2 ∈ U a function EU1,U2 : Jty(→)(U1, U2) → (U1 → U2). Together, a type
interpretation, an interpretation function, and an extension function form an interpretation
I = (U, Jty, J ,E).
An interpretation is extensional if EU1,U2 is injective for all U1, U2. Both intensional
and extensional logics are widely used for interactive theorem proving; for example, Coq’s
calculus of inductive constructions is intensional [14], whereas Isabelle/HOL is extensional
[49]. The semantics is standard if EU1,U2 is bijective for all U1, U2.
For an interpretation I = (U, Jty, J ,E) and a valuation ξ, the denotation of a term is
defined as follows: For variables x, let JxKξI = ξ(x). For symbols f, let Jf〈τ¯〉K
ξ
I = J (f, Jτ¯ K
ξ
Ity
).
For applications s t of a term s : τ → υ to a term t : τ , let U1 = Jτ¯K
ξ
Ity
, U2 = Jυ¯K
ξ
Ity
, and
Js tKξI = EU1,U2(JsK
ξ
I)(JtK
ξ
I). If t is a ground term, we also write JtKI for the denotation of t
because it does not depend on the valuation.
An equation s ≈ t is true in I for ξ if JsKξI = JtK
ξ
I ; otherwise, it is false. A disequation
s 6≈ t is true if s ≈ t is false. A clause is true if at least one of its literals is true. The
interpretation I is a model of a clause C, written I |= C, if C is true in I for all valuations ξ.
It is a model of a set of clauses if it is a model of all contained clauses.
For example, given the signature (Σty,Vty,Σ,V ) = ({κ,→}, {}, {a : κ}, {h : κ → κ}),
the clause h a 6≈ a has an extensional model with U = {U1, U2}, U1 = {a, b} (a 6= b),
U2 = {f}, Jty(κ) = U1, Jty(→)(U1, U1) = U2, J (a) = a, EU1,U1(f)(a) = EU1,U1(f)(b) = b.
4
3. The Inference Systems
We introduce four versions of the clausal λ-free higher-order superposition calculus, varying
along two axes: intentional versus extensional, and nonpurifying versus purifying. To avoid
repetitions, our presentation unifies them into a single framework.
3.1. The Inference Rules. The calculi are parameterized by a partial order ≻ on ground
terms that is well founded and total and that has the subterm property. It must also be
compatible with green contexts, meaning that t′ ≻ t implies s t′ u¯ ≻ s t u¯. On the other
hand, it need not be compatible with arguments: s′ ≻ s need not imply s′ t ≻ s t. Green
contexts are built around green subterms, defined inductively as follows. A term t′ is a green
subterm of t if either t = t′; or t = s u¯ and t′ is a green subterm of ui for some i. We
write s u to indicate that the subterm u of s[u] is a green subterm; correspondingly, s[ ]
is a green context. For example, f and f a are subterms of f a b, but not green subterms;
correspondingly, [ ] a b and [ ] b are not green contexts.
For nonground terms, the only requirement on ≻ is stability under grounding substitu-
tions (i.e., t ≻ s implies tθ ≻ sθ for all substitutions θ grounding t and s). The literal and
clause orders are defined from ≻ as multiset extensions in the standard way [4]. Despite their
names, the term, literal, and clause orders need not be transitive on nonground entities.
Literal selection is supported. The selection function maps each clause C to a subclause
of C consisting of negative literals. A literal L is (strictly) eligible w.r.t. a substitution σ in
C if it is selected in C or there are no selected literals in C and Lσ is (strictly) maximal in
Cσ. If σ is the identity substitution, we leave it implicit.
The following four rules are common to all four calculi. We regard positive and negative
superposition as two cases of the same rule
D︷ ︸︸ ︷
D′ ∨ t ≈ t′
C︷ ︸︸ ︷
C ′ ∨ [¬]s u ≈ s′
Sup
(D′ ∨ C ′ ∨ [¬]s t′ ≈ s′)σ
where σ = mgu(t, u); tσ 6 t′σ; s u σ 6 s′σ; t ≈ t′ is strictly eligible w.r.t. σ in D; s u ≈ s′
is eligible w.r.t. σ in C and, if positive, even strictly eligible; and Cσ 6 Dσ. Moreover, the
variable condition must hold; it varies from one calculus to another and is specified below.
The equality resolution and equality factoring rules are almost identical to their standard
counterparts:
C︷ ︸︸ ︷
C ′ ∨ s 6≈ s′
EqRes
C ′σ
C︷ ︸︸ ︷
C ′ ∨ s′ ≈ t′ ∨ s ≈ t
EqFact
(C ′ ∨ t 6≈ t′ ∨ s ≈ t′)σ
The side conditions for EqRes are σ = mgu(s, s′) and s 6≈ s′ is eligible w.r.t. σ in C. The
side conditions for EqFact are σ = mgu(s, s′), s′σ 6 t′σ, sσ 6 tσ, and s ≈ t is eligible
w.r.t. σ in C.
The following argument congruence rule compensates for the limitation that the super-
position rule applies only to green subterms:
C︷ ︸︸ ︷
C ′ ∨ s ≈ s′
ArgCong
C ′σ ∨ (sσ) x¯ ≈ (s′σ) x¯
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The literal s ≈ s′ must be strictly eligible w.r.t. σ in C, and x¯ is a nonempty tuple of distinct
fresh variables. The substitution σ is the most general type substitution that ensures well-
typedness of the conclusion. In particular, if s takes m arguments, there are m ArgCong
conclusions for this literal, for which σ is the identity and x¯ is a tuple of 1, . . . , m− 1, or
m variables. If the result type of s is a type variable, we have in addition infinitely many
ArgCong conclusions, for which σ instantiates the type variable in the result type of s
with with α¯k → β for some k > 0 and fresh type variables α¯k and β and for which x¯ is a
tuple of m+ k variables.
For the intensional nonpurifying variant, the variable condition of the Sup rule
is as follows: “Either u /∈ V or there exists a grounding substitution θ with tσθ ≻ t′σθ
and Cσθ ≺ C{u 7→ t′}σθ.” This condition generalizes the standard condition that u /∈
V. The two coincide if C is first-order or if the term order is monotonic. In some cases
involving nonmonotonicity, the variable condition effectively mandates Sup inferences at
variable positions of the right premise, but never below. We will call theses inferences at
variables.
For the extensional nonpurifying calculus, the variable condition uses the following
definition.
Definition 3.1. A term of the form x s¯n, for n ≥ 0, jells with a literal t ≈ t
′ ∈ D if t = t˜ y¯n
and t′ = t˜ ′ y¯n for some terms t˜, t˜
′ and distinct variables y¯n that do not occur elsewhere in
D.
Using the naming convention from Definition 3.1 for t˜ ′, the variable condition can be stated
as follows: “If u has a variable head x and jells with the literal t ≈ t′ ∈ D, there must exist
a grounding substitution θ with tσθ ≻ t′σθ and Cσθ ≺ C ′′σθ, where C ′′ = C{x 7→ t˜ ′}.” If
C is first-order, this amounts to u /∈ V. Since the order is compatible with green contexts,
the substitution θ can exist only if x occurs applied in C.
Moreover, the extensional nonpurifying calculus has one additional rule, the positive
extensionality rule, and one axiom, the extensionality axiom. The rule is
C ′ ∨ s x¯ ≈ s′ x¯
PosExt
C ′ ∨ s ≈ s′
where x¯ is a tuple of distinct variables that do not occur in C ′, s, or s′, and s x¯ ≈ s′ x¯
is strictly eligible in the premise. The extensionality axiom uses a polymorphic Skolem
symbol diff : Πα, β. (α→ β)2 → α characterized by the axiom
x (diff〈α, β〉 x y) 6≈ y (diff〈α, β〉 x y) ∨ x ≈ y (Ext)
Unlike the nonpurifying calculi, the purifying calculi never perform superposition at vari-
ables. Instead, they rely on purification [24,31,54,58] (also called abstraction) to circumvent
nonmonotonicity. The idea is to rename apart problematic occurrences of a variable x in a
clause to x1, . . . , xn and to add purification literals x1 6≈ x, . . . , xn 6≈ x to connect the new
variables to x. We must then ensure that all clauses are purified, by processing the initial
clause set and the conclusion of every inference or simplification.
In the intensional purifying calculus, the purification pure(C) of clause C is defined
as the result of the following procedure. Choose a variable x that occurs applied in C and
also unapplied in a literal of C that is not of the form x 6≈ y. If no such variable exists,
terminate. Otherwise, replace all unapplied occurrences of x in C by a fresh variable x′ and
add the purification literal x′ 6≈ x. Then repeat the procedure with another variable. For
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example,
pure(x a ≈ x b ∨ f x ≈ g x) = x a ≈ x b ∨ f x′ ≈ g x′ ∨ x 6≈ x′
The variable condition is “u /∈ V .” The conclusion C of ArgCong is changed to pure(C);
the other rules preserve purity of their premises.
In the extensional purifying calculus, pure(C) is defined as follows. Choose a vari-
able x occurring in green subterms x u¯ and x v¯ in literals of C that are not of the form
x 6≈ y, where u¯ and v¯ are distinct (possibly empty) term tuples. If no such variable exists,
terminate. Otherwise, replace all green subterms x v¯ with x′ v¯, where x′ is fresh, and add
the purification literal x′ 6≈ x. Then repeat the procedure until no variable fulfilling the
requirements is left. For example,
pure(x a ≈ x b ∨ f x ≈ g x) = x a ≈ x′ b ∨ f x′′ ≈ g x′′ ∨ x′ 6≈ x ∨ x′′ 6≈ x
Like the extensional nonpurifying calculus, this calculus variant also contains the PosExt
rule and axiom (Ext) introduced above. The variable condition is “either u has a non-
variable head or u does not jell with the literal t ≈ t′ ∈ D.” The conclusion E of each rule
is changed to pure(E), except for PosExt, which preserves purity.
Finally, we impose further restrictions on literal selection. In the nonpurifying variants,
a literal may not be selected if x u¯ is a maximal term of the clause and the literal contains
a green subterm x v¯ with v¯ 6= u¯. In the purifying calculi, a literal may not be selected if it
contains a variable of functional type. These restrictions are needed for our completeness
proof. It might be possible to avoid them at the cost of a more elaborate argument.
Remark 3.2. In descriptions of first-order logic with equality, the property y ≈ y′ −→
f(x¯, y, z¯) ≈ f(x¯, y′, z¯) is often referred to as “function congruence.” It seems natural to use
the same label for the higher-order version t ≈ t′ −→ s t ≈ s t′ and to call the companion
property s ≈ s′ −→ s t ≈ s′ t “argument congruence,” whence the name ArgCong for our
inference rule. This nomenclature is far from universal; for example, the Isabelle/HOL the-
orem fun_cong captures argument congruence and arg_cong captures function congruence.
3.2. Rationale for the Inference Rules. A key restriction of all four calculi is that
they superpose only at green subterms, mirroring the term order’s compatibility with green
contexts. The ArgCong rule then makes it possible to simulate superposition at non-green
subterms. However, in conjunction with the Sup rules, ArgCong can exhibit an unpleasant
behavior, which we call argument congruence explosion :
g ≈ f
ArgCong
g x ≈ f x h a 6≈ b
Sup
f a 6≈ b
g ≈ f
ArgCong
g x y z ≈ f x y z h a 6≈ b
Sup
f x y a 6≈ b
In both derivation trees, the higher-order variable h is effectively the target of a Sup inference.
Such derivations essentially amount to superposition at variable positions (as shown on the
left) or even superposition below variable positions (as shown on the right), both of which can
be extremely prolific. In standard superposition, the explosion is averted by the condition on
the Sup rule that u /∈ V . In the extensional purifying calculus, the variable condition tests
that either u has a non-variable head or u does not jell with the literal t ≈ t′ ∈ D, which
prevents derivations such as the above. In the corresponding nonpurifying variant, some
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such derivations may need to be performed when the term order exhibits nonmonotonicity
for the terms of interest.
In the intensional calculi, the explosion can arise because the variable conditions are
weaker. The following example shows that the intensional nonpurifying calculus would be
incomplete if we used the variable condition of the extensional nonpurifying calculus.
Example 3.3. Consider a left-to-right LPO [20] instance with precedence h ≻ g ≻ f ≻ b ≻ a,
and consider the following unsatisfiable clause set:
h x ≈ f x g (x b) x ≈ a g (f b) h 6≈ a
The only possible inference is a Sup inference of the first into the second clause, but the
variable condition of the extensional nonpurifying calculus is not met.
It is unclear whether the variable condition of the intensional purifying calculus could be
strengthened, but our completeness proof suggests that it cannot.
The variable conditions in the extensional calculi are designed to prevent the argument
congruence explosion shown above, but since they consider only the shape of the clauses,
they might also block Sup inferences whose side premises do not originate from ArgCong.
This is why we need the PosExt rule.
Example 3.4. In the following unsatisfiable clause set, the only possible inference from
these clauses in the extensional nonpurifying calculus is PosExt, showing its necessity:
g x ≈ f x g 6≈ f x (diff〈α, β〉 x y) 6≈ y (diff〈α, β〉 x y) ∨ x ≈ y
The same argument applies for the purifying variant with the difference that the third clause
must be purified.
Due to nonmonotonicity, for refutational completeness we need either to purify the clauses
or to allow some superposition at variable positions, as mandated by the respective variable
conditions. Without either of these measures, at least the extensional calculi and presumably
also the intensional calculi would be incomplete, as the next example demonstrates.
Example 3.5. Consider the following clause set:
k (g x ) ≈ k (x b) k (f (h a) b) 6≈ k (g h) f (h a) ≈ h f (h a) x ≈ h x
x (diff〈α, β〉 x y) 6≈ y (diff〈α, β〉 x y) ∨ x ≈ y
Using a left-to-right LPO [20] instance with precedence k ≻ h ≻ g ≻ f ≻ b ≻ a, this clause
set is saturated w.r.t. the extensional purifying calculus when omitting purification. It also
quickly saturates using the extensional nonpurifying calculus when omitting Sup inferences
at variables. By contrast, the intensional variants derive ⊥, even without purification and
without Sup inferences at variables, because of the less restrictive variable conditions.
This raises the question as to whether the intensional variants actually need to purify or to
perform Sup inferences at variables. Omitting purification and Sup inferences at variables
in the intensional calculi is complete when redundant clauses are kept, but we conjecture
that it is incomplete in general.
We initially considered inference rules instead of axiom (Ext). However, we did not
find a set of inference rules that is complete and leads to fewer inferences than (Ext). We
considered the PosExt rule described above in combination with the following rule:
C ∨ s 6≈ t
NegExt
C ∨ s (sk〈α¯〉 x¯n) 6≈ t (sk〈α¯〉 x¯n)
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where sk is a fresh Skolem symbol and α¯ and x¯n are the type and term variables occurring
free in the the literal s 6≈ t. However, these two rules do not suffice for a refutationally
complete calculus, as the following example demonstrates:
Example 3.6. Consider the clause set
f x ≈ a g x ≈ a h f ≈ b h g 6≈ b
Assuming that all four equations are oriented from left to right, this set is saturated w.r.t. the
extensional calculi if (Ext) is replaced by NegExt; yet it is unsatisfiable in an extensional
logic.
Example 3.7. A significant advantage of our calculi over the use of standard superposition
on applicatively encoded problems is the flexibility they offer in orienting equations. The
following equations provide two definitions of addition on Peano numbers:
addL Zero y ≈ y addR x Zero ≈ x
addL (Succ x) y ≈ addL x (Succ y) addR x (Succ y) ≈ addR (Succ x ) y
Let addL (Succ
100 Zero) n 6≈ addR n (Succ
100 Zero) be the negated conjecture. With LPO,
we can use a left-to-right comparison for addL’s arguments and a right-to-left comparison for
addR’s arguments to orient all four equations from left to right. Then the negated conjecture
can be simplified to Succ100 n 6≈ Succ100 n by simplification (demodulation), and ⊥ can be
derived with a single inference. If we use the applicative encoding instead, there is no
instance of LPO or KBO that can orient both recursive equations from left to right. For at
least one of the two sides of the negated conjecture, simplification is replaced by 100 Sup
inferences, which is much less efficient, especially in the presence of additional axioms.
3.3. Soundness. To show the inferences’ soundness, we need the substitution lemma for
our logic:
Lemma 3.8 (Substitution lemma). Let I = (U, Jty, J ,E) be a λ-free higher-order interpre-
tation. Then
JτρKξIty = JτK
ξ′
Ity and JtρK
ξ
I = JtK
ξ′
I
for all terms t, all types τ , and all substitutions ρ, where ξ′(α) = JαρKξIty for all type variables
α and ξ′(x) = JxρKξI for all term variables x.
Proof. First, we prove that JτρKξIty = JτK
ξ′
Ity
by induction on the structure of τ . If τ = α is a
type variable,
JαρKξIty = ξ
′(α) = JαKξ
′
Ity
If τ = κ(υ¯) for some type constructor κ and types υ¯,
Jκ(υ¯)ρKξIty = Jty(κ)(Jυ¯ρK
ξ
Ity)
IH
= Jty(κ)(Jυ¯K
ξ′
Ity) = Jκ(υ¯)K
ξ′
Ity
Next, we prove JtρKξI = JtK
ξ′
I by structural induction on t. If t = y, then by the definition
of the denotation of a variable
JyρKξI = ξ
′(y) = JyKξ
′
I
If t = f〈τ¯ 〉, then by the definition of the term denotation
Jf〈τ¯〉ρKξI = J (f, Jτ¯ ρK
ξ
Ity)
IH
= J (f, Jτ¯ Kξ
′
Ity) = Jf〈τ¯〉K
ξ′
I
If t = u v, then by the definition of the term denotation
J(u v)ρKξI = EU1,U2(JuρK
ξ
I)(JvρK
ξ
I)
IH
= EU1,U2(JuK
ξ′
I )(JvK
ξ′
I ) = Ju vK
ξ′
I
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where u is of type τ → υ, U1 = JτρK
ξ
Ity
IH
= JτKξ
′
Ity
, and U2 = JυρK
ξ
Ity
IH
= JυKξ
′
Ity
.
Lemma 3.9. If I |= C for some interpretation I and some clause C, then I |= Cρ for all
substitutions ρ.
Proof. We need to show that C is true in I for all valuations ξ. Given a valuation ξ, define
ξ′ as in Lemma 3.8. Then, by Lemma 3.8, a literal in Cρ is true in I for ξ if and only if the
corresponding literal in C is true in I for ξ′. There must be at least one such literal because
I |= C and hence C is in particular true in I for ξ′. Therefore, Cρ is true in I for ξ.
Theorem 3.10 (Soundness of the intensional calculi). The inference rules Sup, EqRes,
EqFact, and ArgCong are sound (even without the variable condition and the side con-
ditions on order and eligibility).
Proof. We fix an inference and an interpretation I that is a model of the premises. We need
to show that it is also a model of the conclusion.
From the definition of the denotation of a term, it is obvious that congruence holds at
all subterms in our logic. By Lemma 3.9, I is a model of the σ-instances of the premises as
well, where σ is the substitution used for the inference. Fix a valuation ξ. By making case
distinctions on the truth in I under ξ of the literals of the σ-instances of the premises, using
the conditions that σ is a unifier, and applying congruence, it follows that the conclusion is
also true in I under ξ.
Theorem 3.11 (Soundness of the extensional calculi). The inference rules Sup, EqRes,
EqFact, ArgCong, and PosExt are sound w.r.t. extensional interpretations (even with-
out the variable condition and the side conditions on order and eligibility).
Proof. We only need to prove soundness of PosExt. For the other rules, we can proceed as
in Theorem 3.10. By induction on the length of x¯, it suffices to prove soundness of PosExt
for one variable x instead of a tuple x¯. We fix an inference and an extensional interpretation
I that is a model of the premise C ′ ∨ s x ≈ s′ x. We need to show that it is also a model of
the conclusion C ′ ∨ s ≈ s′.
Let ξ be a valuation. If C ′ is true in I under ξ, the conclusion is clearly true as well.
Otherwise C ′ is false in I under ξ, and also under ξ[x 7→ a] for all a because x does not
occur in C ′. Since the premise is true in I , s x = s′ x must be true in I under ξ[x 7→ a] for
all a. Hence, for appropriate universes U1, U2, we have EU1,U2(JsK
ξ[x 7→a]
I )(a) = Js xK
ξ[x 7→a]
I =
Js′ xKξ[x 7→a]I = EU1,U2(Js
′Kξ[x 7→a]I )(a). Since s and s
′ do not contain x, JsKξ[x 7→a]I and Js
′Kξ[x 7→a]I
do not depend on a. Thus, EU1,U2(JsK
ξ
I) = EU1,U2(Js
′KξI). Since I is extensional, EU1,U2 is
injective and hence JsKξI = Js
′KξI . It follows that s ≈ s
′ is true in I under ξ, and so is the
entire conclusion of the inference.
A problem expressed in higher-order logic must be transformed into clausal normal
form before the calculi can be applied. This process works as in the first-order case, except
for skolemization. The issue is that skolemization, when performed naively, is unsound
for higher-order logic with a Henkin semantics [48, Section 6], because it introduces new
functions that can be used to instantiate variables.
The core of this article is not affected by this because the problems are given in clausal
form. For the implementation, we claim soundness only w.r.t. models that satisfy the axiom
of choice, which is the semantics mandated by the TPTP THF format [62]. By contrast,
refutational completeness holds w.r.t. arbitrary models as defined above. Alternatively,
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skolemization can be made sound by introducing mandatory arguments as described by
Miller [48, Section 6] and in the conference version of this article [11].
This issue also affects axiom (Ext) because it contains the Skolem symbol diff. As a
consequence, (Ext) does not hold in all extensional interpretations. The extensional calculi
are thus only sound w.r.t. interpretations in which (Ext) holds. However, we can prove that
(Ext) is compatible with our logic:
Theorem 3.12. Axiom (Ext) is satisfiable.
Proof. For a given signature, let (U, Jty, J ,E) be an Herbrand interpretation. That is, we
define U to contain the set Uτ of all terms of type τ for each ground type τ , we define Jty
by Jty(κ)(τ¯ ) = κ(τ¯), we define J by J (f,Uτ¯ ) = f〈τ¯〉, and we define E by EUτ ,Uυ(f)(a) = f a.
Then EUτ ,Uυ is clearly injective and hence I is extensional. To show that I |= (Ext), we
need to show that (Ext) is true under all valuations. Let ξ be a valuation. If x ≈ y is true
under ξ, (Ext) is also true. Otherwise x ≈ y is false, and hence ξ(x) 6= ξ(y). Then we have
Jx (diff〈α, β〉 x y)KξI = (ξ(x)) (diff〈α, β〉 (ξ(x)) (ξ(y))) 6= (ξ(y)) (diff〈α, β〉 (ξ(x)) (ξ(y))) =
Jy (diff〈α, β〉 x y)KξI . Therefore, x (diff〈α, β〉 x y) 6≈ y (diff〈α, β〉 x y) is true in I under ξ
and so is (Ext).
3.4. Redundancy Criterion. For our calculi, a redundant (or composite) clause cannot
simply be defined as a clause whose ground instances are entailed by smaller (≺) ground
instances of existing clauses, because this would make all ArgCong inferences redundant.
Our solution is to base the redundancy criterion on a weaker ground logic—ground monomor-
phic first-order logic—in which argument congruence does not hold. This logic also plays a
central role in our refutational completeness proof.
We employ an encoding F to translate ground λ-free higher-order terms into ground
first-order terms. It indexes each symbol occurrence with its type arguments and its term
argument count. Thus, F (f) = f0, F (f a) = f1(a0), and F (g〈κ〉) = g
κ
0 . This is enough to
disable argument congruence; for example, {f ≈ h, f a 6≈ h a} is unsatisfiable, whereas its
encoding {f0 ≈ h0, f1(a0) 6≈ h1(a0)} is satisfiable. For clauses built from fully applied ground
terms, the two logics are isomorphic, as we would expect from a graceful generalization.
Given a ground λ-free higher-order signature (Σty, {},Σ, {}), we define a ground first-
order signature (Σty, {},ΣGF, {}) as follows. The type constructors Σty are the same in both
signatures, but→ is uninterpreted in first-order logic. For each symbol f : Πα¯m. τ1 → · · · →
τn → τ in Σ, where τ is not functional, we introduce symbols f
υ¯m
l ∈ ΣGF with argument
types τ¯lσ and return type (τl+1 → · · · → τn → τ)σ, where σ = {α¯m 7→ υ¯m}, for each tuple
of ground types υ¯m and each l ∈ {0, . . . , n}.
For example, let Σ = {a : κ, g : κ → κ → κ}. The corresponding first-order signature
is ΣGF = {a0 : κ, g0 : κ→ κ→ κ, g1 : κ⇒ κ→ κ, g2 : κ
2 ⇒ κ} where f : τ¯ ⇒ υ denotes
a first-order function symbol f with argument types τ¯ and return type υ, and → is an
uninterpreted binary type constructor. The term F (g a a) = g2(a0, a0) has type κ, and
F (g a) = g1(a0) has type κ→ κ.
Thus, we consider three layers of logics: the λ-free higher-order layer H over a given sig-
nature (Σty,Vty,Σ,V ), the ground λ-free higher-order layer GH over the signature (Σty, {},
Σ, {}), and the ground monomorphic first-order layer GF over the signature (Σty, {},ΣGF, {})
defined above. We use TH, TGH, and TGF to denote the respective sets of terms, TyH, TyGH,
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and Ty
GF
to denote the respective sets of types, and CH, CGH, and CGF to denote the re-
spective sets of clauses. In the purifying calculi, we exceptionally let CH denote the set of
purified clauses. Each of the three layers has an entailment relation |=. A clause set N1
entails a clause set N2, denoted N1 |= N2, if any model of N1 is also a model of N2. On
H and GH, we use λ-free higher-order models for the intensional variants and extensional
λ-free higher-order models for the extensional variants; on GF, we use first-order models.
This machinery may seem excessive, but it is essential to define redundancy of clauses and
inferences properly, and it will play an important role in the refutational completeness proof
(Section 4).
The three layers are connected by two functions G and F . The grounding function G
maps terms from TH to the set of their ground instances in TGH and clauses from CH to the
set of their ground instances in CGH. The encoding F : TGH → TGF is defined recursively as
F (f〈υ¯m〉 u¯) = f
υ¯m
l (F (u¯l)). It can be extended to literals and clauses by mapping each side
of a literal and each literal in a clause. The encoding F is bijective with inverse F −1. Using
F −1, the clause order ≻ on TGH can be transferred to TGF by defining t ≻ s as equivalent to
F −1(t) ≻ F −1(s). The property that ≻ on clauses is the multiset extension of ≻ on literals,
which in turn is the multiset extension of ≻ on terms, is maintained because F −1 maps the
multiset representations elementwise.
Crucially, green subterms in TGH correspond to subterms in TGF (Lemma 3.13), whereas
non-green subterms in TGH are not subterms at all in TGF.
To state the correspondence between green subterms in TGH and subterms in TGF ex-
plicitly, we define positions of green subterms as follows. A term s ∈ TH is a green subterm
at position ǫ of s. If a term s ∈ TH is a green subterm at position p of ui for some 1 ≤ i ≤ n,
then s is a green subterm at position i.p of f〈τ¯ 〉 u¯n and of x u¯n. For TGF, positions are
defined as usual in first-order logic.
Lemma 3.13. Let s, t ∈ TGH. We have F (t s p) = F (t)[F (s)]p. In other words, s is a
green subterm of t at position p if and only if F (s) is a subterm of F (t) at position p.
Proof. By induction on p. If p = ε, then s = t[s]p. Hence F (t[s]p) = F (s) = F (t) F (s) p.
If p = i.p′, then t[s]p = f〈τ¯ 〉 u¯n with ui = ui[s]p′ . Applying F , we obtain by the induction
hypothesis that F (ui) = F (ui) F (s) p′ . Therefore, F (t[s]p) = f
τ¯
n(F (u1), . . . ,F (ui−1),
F (ui) F (s) p′ ,F (ui+1), . . . ,F (un)). It follows that F (t[s]p) = F (t) F (s) p.
Corollary 3.14. Given s, t ∈ TGF, we have F
−1(t[s]p) = F
−1(t) F −1(s) p.
Lemma 3.15. Well-foundedness, totality, compatibility with contexts, and the subterm
property hold for ≻ on TGF.
Proof. Compatibility with contexts: We must show that s ≻ s′ implies t[s]p ≻ t[s
′]p
for terms t, s, s′ ∈ TGF. Assuming s ≻ s
′, we have F −1(s) ≻ F −1(s′). By compatibility with
green contexts on TGH, we have F
−1(t) F −1(s) p ≻ F
−1(t) F −1(s′) p. By Corollary 3.14,
we have t[s]p ≻ t[s
′]p.
Well-foundedness: Assume that there exists an infinite descending chain t1 ≻ t2 ≻ · · ·
in TGF. By applying F
−1, we then obtain the chain F −1(t1) ≻ F
−1(t2) ≻ · · · in TGH,
contradicting well-foundedness on TGH.
Totality: Let s, t ∈ TGF. Then F
−1(t) and F −1(s) must be comparable by totality in
TGH. Hence, t and s are comparable.
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Subterm property: By Corollary 3.14 and the subterm property on TGH, F
−1(t[s]p) =
F −1(t) F −1(s) p ≻ F
−1(s). Hence, t[s]p ≻ s.
In standard superposition, redundancy relies on the entailment relation |= on ground
clauses. We will define redundancy on GH and H in the same way, but using GF’s entailment
relation. This notion of redundancy gracefully generalizes the first-order notion, without
making all ArgCong inferences redundant.
The standard redundancy criterion for standard superposition cannot justify subsump-
tion deletion. Following Waldmann et al. [66], we define a redundancy criterion that can
justify subsumption deletion by employing a well-founded order = on CH.
We define the sets of redundant clauses w.r.t. a given clause set as follows:
– Given C ∈ CGF and N ⊆ CGF, let C ∈ GFRedC(N) if {D ∈ N | D ≺ C} |= C.
– Given C ∈ CGH and N ⊆ CGH, let C ∈ GHRedC(N) if F (C) ∈ GFRedC(F (N)).
– Given C ∈ CH and N ⊆ CH, let C ∈ HRedC(N) if for every D ∈ G(C), we have
D ∈ GHRedC(G(N)) or there exists C
′ ∈ N such that C = C ′ and D ∈ G(C).
Along with the three layers of logics, we consider three inference systems: HInf , GHInf
and GFInf . HInf is one of the four variants of the inference system described in Section 3.1.
For uniformity, we regard axiom (Ext) as a premise-free inference rule Ext whose conclusion
is (Ext). In the purifying calculi, the conclusion of Ext must be purified. GHInf consists
of all Sup, EqRes, and EqFact inferences from HInf whose premises and conclusion are
ground, a premise-free rule GExt whose infinitely many conclusions are the ground instances
of (Ext), and the following ground variant of ArgCong:
C ′ ∨ s ≈ s′
GArgCong
C ′ ∨ s u¯n ≈ s
′ u¯n
where s ≈ s′ is strictly eligible in the premise and u¯n is a nonempty tuple of ground terms.
GFInf contains all Sup, EqRes, and EqFact inferences from GHInf translated by F . It
coincides exactly with standard first-order superposition. Given a Sup, EqRes, or EqFact
inference ι ∈ GHInf , let F (ι) denote the corresponding inference in GFInf .
Given an inference ι, we write prems(ι) for the tuple of premises, mprem(ι) for the
main (i.e., rightmost) premise, preconcl (ι) for the conclusion before purification, and concl(ι)
for the conclusion after purification. For the nonpurifying variants, preconcl (ι) = concl(ι)
simply denotes the conclusion.
Each of the three inference systems is parameterized by a selection function sel . Occa-
sionally, we will make this dependency explicit, writing HInf sel for HInf and similarly for
GHInf and GFInf . For each selection function sel on CGH, via the bijection F , we can obtain
a corresponding selection function on CGF, which we denote F (sel). There is, however, no
general way to derive the right selection function on CGH from a selection function on CH. In
the refutational completeness proof, given a saturated clause setN ⊆ CH and a selection func-
tion on CH, we need a selection function on CGH such that for each clause C ∈ G(N) there ex-
ists a clause D ∈ N with C ∈ G(D) and corresponding selected literals. Since the saturated
clause set N is not known during a derivation, our redundancy criterion may not depend on
it. Therefore, we consider all selection functions on CGH such that for each clause in C ∈ CGH,
there exists a clause D ∈ CH with C ∈ G(D) and corresponding selected literals. Given a
selection function sel on CH, let G(sel) denote the set of such selection functions on CGH.
Given a selection function sel on CH, a selection function gsel ∈ G(sel), and a non-
PosExt inference ι ∈ HInf sel , we define the set Ggsel (ι) of ground instances of ι to be all
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inferences ι′ ∈ GHInf gsel such that prems(ι′) = prems(ι)θ and concl (ι′) = preconcl (ι)θ for
some grounding substitution θ. This will map Sup to Sup, EqFact to EqFact, EqRes
to EqRes, Ext to GExt, and ArgCong to GArgCong inferences, but it is also possible
that Ggsel (ι) is the empty set for some inferences ι. For PosExt inferences ι, which cannot
be grounded, we let Ggsel(ι) = undef .
We define the sets of redundant inferences w.r.t. a given clause set as follows:
– Given ι ∈ GFInf gsel and N ⊆ CGF, let ι ∈ GFRed
gsel
I (N) if prems(ι) ∩ GFRedC(N) 6= ∅
or {D ∈ N | D ≺ mprem(ι)} |= concl(ι).
– Given ι ∈ GHInf gsel and N ⊆ CGH, let ι ∈ GHRed
gsel
I (N) if
– ι is not a GArgCong or GExt inference and F (ι) ∈ GFRed
F (gsel)
I (F (N)); or
– the calculus variant is nonpurifying and ι is a GArgCong or GExt inference and
concl(ι) ∈ N ∪ GHRedC(N); or
– the calculus variant is purifying and ι is a GArgCong or GExt inference and F (N) |=
F (concl (ι)).
– Given ι ∈ HInf sel and N ⊆ CH, let ι ∈ HRed I(N) if
– ι is not a PosExt inference and Ggsel(ι) ⊆ GHRed I(G(N)) for all gsel ∈ G(sel); or
– ι is a PosExt inference and G(concl(ι)) ∈ G(N) ∪ GHRedC(G(N)).
Occasionally, we omit the selection function in the notation when it is irrelevant. A clause
set N is saturated w.r.t. an inference system and a redundancy criterion (Red I,RedC) if
every inference from clauses in N is in Red I(N).
4. Refutational Completeness
Besides soundness, the most important property of the the four calculi introduced in Sec-
tion 3.1 is refutational completeness. To circumvent the term order’s potential nonmono-
tonicity, our Sup inference rule only considers green subterms. This is reflected in our proof
by the reliance on the layer GF introduced in Section 3.4. The equation g0 ≈ f0 ∈ CGF,
which corresponds to the equation g ≈ f ∈ CGH, cannot be used directly to rewrite the
clause g1(a0) 6≈ f1(a0) ∈ CGF, which corresponds to g a 6≈ f a ∈ CGH. Instead, we first
need to apply ArgCong to derive g x ≈ f x, which after grounding and transfer to GF
yields g1(a0) ≈ f1(a0). The GF layer is a device that enables us to reuse the refutational
completeness result for standard (first-order) superposition.
The proof proceeds in three steps, corresponding to the three layers GF, GH, and H
introduced in Section 3.4:
(1) We use Bachmair and Ganzinger’s work on the refutational completeness of standard
superposition [4] to prove static refutational completeness of GFInf .
(2) From the first-order model constructed in Bachmair and Ganzinger’s proof, we derive a
clausal λ-free higher-order model to prove static refutational completeness of GHInf .
(3) We use the saturation framework of Waldmann et al. [66] to lift the static refutational
completeness of GHInf to static and dynamic refutational completeness of HInf .
In step (1), since the inference system GFInf is standard ground superposition, we only
need to work around minor differences between Bachmair and Ganzinger’s definitions and
ours. Given a saturated clause set N ⊆ CGF with ⊥ 6∈ N , Bachmair and Ganzinger prove
refutational completeness by constructing a term rewriting system RN and showing that it
can be viewed as an interpretation that is a model of N . This step is exclusively concerned
with ground first-order clauses.
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In step (2), we derive refutational completeness of GHInf . Given a saturated clause set
N ⊆ CGH with ⊥ 6∈ N , we use the first-order model RF (N) of F (N) constructed in step (1)
to derive a clausal higher-order interpretation that is a model of N . Thanks to saturation
w.r.t. GArgCong, the higher-order interpretation can conflate the interpretations of the
members f υ¯0 , . . . , f
υ¯
n of a same symbol family. In the extensional variants, saturation w.r.t.
GExt can be used to show that the constructed interpretation is extensional.
In step (3), we employ the saturation framework of Waldmann et al. [66] to prove
refutational completeness of HInf . The main proof obligation the framework leaves to us is
that there exist inferences in HInf corresponding to all nonredundant inferences in GHInf .
For monotone term orders, we can avoid Sup inferences into variables x by exploiting the
clause order’s compatibility with contexts: If t′ ≺ t, we have C{x 7→ t′} ≺ C{x 7→ t}, which
allows us to show that Sup inferences into variables are redundant. This technique fails for
variables x that occur applied in C, because the order lacks compatibility with arguments.
This is why the calculi must either purify clauses to make this line of reasoning work again
or perform some Sup inferences into variables.
4.1. The Ground First-Order Layer. We use Bachmair and Ganzinger’s results on
standard superposition [4] to prove refutational completeness of GF. In the subsequent
steps, we will also make use of specific properties of Bachmair and Ganzinger’s model.
Bachmair and Ganzinger’s logic and inference system differ in some details from GF:
– In addition to their side conditions on the equality factoring rule, our rule EqFact requires
that s′σ 6 t′σ. Bachmair and Ganzinger’s proofs can be easily adapted to cope with this
additional restriction. In the proof of their Lemma 4.11, case (iii), we have s 6= t because
s ≻ t by assumption. In the proof of the same lemma, case (iv), we have u 6= v because
∆ ∩ IC = ∅.
– Bachmair and Ganzinger use untyped first-order logic, whereas GF’s logic is typed. Bach-
mair and Ganzinger’s proof works verbatim for monomorphic first-order logic as well, but
we need to require that the order ≻ has the subterm property to show that there exist no
critical pairs in the term rewriting system, as observed by Wand [67, Section 3.2.1].
– In their redundancy criterion for clauses, Bachmair and Ganzinger require that a finite
subset of {D ∈ N | D ≺ C} entails C, whereas we require that {D ∈ N | D ≺ C}
entails C. By compactness of first-order logic, the two criteria are equivalent.
The basis of Bachmair and Ganzinger’s proof is that a term rewriting system R defines
an interpretation TGF/R such that for every ground equation s ≈ t, we have TGF/R |= s ≈ t
if and only if s↔∗R t. Formally, TGF/R denotes the monomorphic first-order interpretation
whose universes Uτ consist of the R-equivalence classes over TGF containing terms of type τ .
The interpretation TGF/R is term-generated—that is, for every element a of the universe of
this interpretation and for any valuation ξ, there exists a ground term t such that JtKξTGF/R =
a. To lighten notation, we will write R to refer to both the term rewriting system R and
the interpretation TGF/R.
The term rewriting system is constructed as follows. Let N ⊆ CGF. We first define sets
of rewrite rules ECN and R
C
N for all C ∈ N by induction on the clause order. Assume that
EDN has already been defined for all D ∈ N such that D ≺ C. Then R
C
N =
⋃
D≺C E
D
N . Let
ECN = {s→ t} if the following conditions are met:
(a) C = C ′ ∨ s ≈ t;
(b) s ≈ t is strictly maximal in C;
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(c) s ≻ t;
(d) C ′ is false in RCN ;
(e) s is irreducible w.r.t. RCN .
Then C is said to produce s→ t. Otherwise, ECN = ∅. Finally, RN =
⋃
D E
D
N .
We call an inference ι ∈ GFInf B&G-redundant if some C ∈ prems(ι) is true in RCN or
concl(ι) is true in R
mprem(ι)
N . We call a set N ⊆ CGF B&G-saturated if all inferences from N
are B&G-redundant.
Lemma 4.1. If ⊥ 6∈ N and N ⊆ CGF is saturated w.r.t. GFInf and GFRed I, then N is
B&G-saturated.
Proof. Let N ⊆ CGF be saturated w.r.t. GFInf and GFRed I. To show that N is B&G-
saturated, let ι be an inference from N . We need to show that ι is B&G-redundant w.r.t. N .
We proceed by well-founded induction on mprem(ι) w.r.t. ≻. By the induction hypothesis,
for all inferences ι′ with concl(ι′) ≺ mprem(ι), ι′ is B&G-redundant w.r.t. N . By Lemma 5.5
of Bachmair and Ganzinger, ι is B&G-redundant w.r.t. N .
Lemma 4.2. Let ⊥ 6∈ N and N ⊆ CGF be saturated w.r.t. GFInf and GFRed I. If C =
C ′ ∨ s ≈ t ∈ N produces s→ t, then s ≈ t is strictly eligible in C and C ′ is false in RN .
Proof. By Lemma 4.1, N is also B&G-saturated. By condition (d), C ′ is false in RCN . Since
s ≻ t by condition (c) and s is irreducible w.r.t. RCN by condition (e), s ≈ t is also false in
RCN . Hence, C is false in R
C
N . Using this and conditions (a), (b), (c), and (e), we can apply
Lemma 4.11 of Bachmair and Ganzinger. Part (ii) of that lemma shows that s ≈ t is strictly
eligible in C, and part (iv) shows that C ′ is false in RN .
Theorem 4.3 (Ground first-order static refutational completeness). Let ⊥ 6∈ N and N ⊆
CGF be saturated w.r.t. GFInf and GFRed I. Then RN is a model of N .
Proof. By Lemma 4.1, N is also B&G-saturated. It follows that RN is a model of N , as
shown in the proof of Theorem 4.14 of Bachmair and Ganzinger.
4.2. The Ground Higher-Order Layer. In this subsection, let sel be a selection function
on CGH, let N ⊆ CGH be a clause set saturated w.r.t. GHInf
sel and GHRed selI , and let ⊥ 6∈ N .
Clearly, F (N) is then saturated w.r.t. GFInf F (sel) and GFRed
F (sel)
I .
We abbreviate RF (N) as R. From R, we construct a model I
GH of N . The key prop-
erties enabling us to perform this construction are that R is term-generated and that the
interpretations of the members f υ¯0 , . . . , f
υ¯
n of a same symbol family behave in the same way
thanks to the ArgCong rule.
Lemma 4.4 (Argument congruence). For terms s, t, u ∈ TGH, if JF (s)KR = JF (t)KR, then
JF (s u)KR = JF (t u)KR.
Proof. What we want to show is equivalent to
F (s)↔∗R F (t) implies F (s u)↔
∗
R F (t u)
By induction on the number of rewrite steps and due to symmetry, it suffices to show that
F (s)→R F (t) implies F (s u)↔
∗
R F (t u)
If the rewrite step from F (s) is below the top level, this is obvious because there is an
corresponding rewrite step from F (s u). If it is at the top level, F (s)→ F (t) must be rule
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of R. This rule must come from a productive clause of the form F (C) = F (C ′ ∨ s ≈ t).
By Lemma 4.2, F (s ≈ t) is strictly eligible in F (C) w.r.t. F (sel), and hence s ≈ t is
strictly eligible in C w.r.t. sel . Moreover, s and t have functional type. Thus, the following
GArgCong inference ι is applicable:
C ′ ∨ s ≈ t
GArgCong
C ′ ∨ s u ≈ t u
By saturation, ι is redundant w.r.t. N—i.e., we have concl(ι) ∈ N ∪ GHRedC(N) (for
nonpurifying variants) or F (N) |= concl(ι) (for purifying variants). In both cases, by
Theorem 4.3, F (concl(ι)) is then true in R. By Lemma 4.2, F (C ′) is false in R. Therefore,
F (s u ≈ t u) must be true in R.
Lemma 4.5. For terms s, t, u, v ∈ TGH, if JF (s)KR = JF (t)KR and JF (u)KR = JF (v)KR,
then JF (s u)KR = JF (t v)KR.
Proof. By Lemma 4.4, we have JF (s u)KR = JF (t u)KR. It remains to show that JF (t u)KR =
JF (t v)KR. Since t is ground, it must be of the form f〈υ¯m〉 t¯n. Let J be the interpretation
function of the interpretation R. Then
JF (t u)KR = J (f
υ¯m
n+1)(JF (t¯n)KR, JF (u)KR) = J (f
υ¯m
n+1)(JF (t¯n)KR, JF (v)KR) = JF (t v)KR
Definition 4.6. Define a higher-order interpretation IGH = (UGH, JGHty , J
GH,EGH) as
follows. The interpretation R defined above is an interpretation in monomorphic first-
order logic. Let Uτ be its universe for type τ and and J its interpretation function. Let
UGH = {Uτ | τ is a ground type}. Let J
GH
ty (κ)(Uτ¯ ) = Uκ(τ¯) for all type constructors κ and
type tuples τ¯ . Let JGH(f, Uτ¯ ) = J (f
τ¯
0 ).
Since R is term-generated, for every a ∈ Uτ→υ and b ∈ Uτ , there exist ground terms
s : τ → υ and u : τ such that JF (s)KR = a and JF (u)KR = b. We define E
GH by
EGHUτ ,Uυ(a)(b) = JF (s u)KR for any term u. By Lemma 4.5, this definition is independent of
the choice of s and u.
Lemma 4.7 (Model transfer to GH). IGH is a model of N . In the extensional variants,
IGH is an extensional model of N .
Proof. We first prove by induction on terms t ∈ TGH that JtKIGH = JF (t)KR. Let t ∈ TGH,
and assume as the induction hypothesis that JuKIGH = JF (u)KR for all subterms u of t. If t
is of the form f〈υ¯〉, then
JtKIGH = J
GH(f, Uυ¯) = J (f
υ¯
0 ) = Jf
υ¯
0 KR = JF (f〈υ¯〉)KR = JF (t)KR
If t is an application t = t1 t2, where t1 is of type τ → υ, then, using the definition of the
term denotation and of EGH, we have
Jt1 t2KIGH = E
GH
Uτ ,Uυ(Jt1KIGH)(Jt2KIGH)
IH
= EGHUτ ,Uυ(JF (t1)KR)(JF (t2)KR) = JF (t1 t2)KR
So we have shown that JtKIGH = JF (t)KR for all terms t. It follows that a ground
equation s ≈ t is true in IGH if and only if F (s ≈ t) is true in R. Hence a ground clause
C is true in IGH if and only if F (C) is true in R. By Theorem 4.3, R is a model of F (N).
Thus, IGH is a model of N .
For the extensional variants, it remains to show that IGH is extensional—i.e., we have
to show that for all τ and υ and all a, b ∈ Uτ→υ, if a 6= b, then E
GH(a) 6= EGH(b). Since
R is term-generated, there are terms s, t ∈ TGF such that JsKR = a and JtKR = b. By what
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we have shown above, it follows that Js′KIGH = a and Jt
′KIGH = b for s
′ = F −1(s) and
t′ = F −1(t).
Since N is saturated, the GExt inference that generates the clause
C = s′ (diff〈τ, υ〉 s′ t′) 6≈ t′ (diff〈τ, υ〉 s′ t′) ∨ s′ ≈ t′
is redundant—i.e., C ∈ N ∪ GHRedC(N) (in nonpurifying variants) or F (N) |= F (C) (in
purifying variants). In both cases, it follows that R |= F (C) by Theorem 4.3 and thus
IGH |= C by what we have shown above. The second literal of C is false in IGH because
Js′KIGH = a 6= b = Jt
′KIGH. So the first literal of C must be true in I
GH and thus
EGH(a)(Jdiff〈τ, υ〉 s′ t′KIGH) = Js
′ (diff〈τ, υ〉 s′ t′)KIGH
6= Jt′ (diff〈τ, υ〉 s′ t′)KIGH = E
GH(b)(Jdiff〈τ, υ〉 s′ t′KIGH)
It follows that EGH(a) 6= EGH(b).
We summarize the results of this subsection in the following theorem:
Theorem 4.8 (Ground static refutational completeness). Let N ⊆ CGH be a clause set
saturated w.r.t. GHInf gsel and GHRed
gsel
I for some selection function gsel . Then N |= ⊥ if
and only if ⊥ ∈ N .
4.3. The Nonground Higher-Order Layer. To lift the result to the nonground layer,
we employ the saturation framework of Waldmann et al. [66]. It is easy to see that the
entailment relation |= on GH is a consequence relation in the sense of the framework. It
remains to show that our redundancy criterion on GH is a redundancy criterion in the sense
of the framework and that G is a grounding function in the sense of the framework:
Lemma 4.9. Given an interpretation I on GH, there exists an interpretation IGF on GF
such that for any clause C ∈ CGH the truth values of C in I and of F (C) in I
GF coincide.
Proof. Let I = (U, Jty, J ,E) be an interpretation on GH. Let U
GF
τ = JτKIty be the first-
order type universe for the ground type τ . For a symbol f υ¯ml ∈ ΣGF and universe elements
a¯l, let J
GF(f υ¯ml )(a¯l) = Jf〈υ¯m〉 x¯lK
{x¯l 7→a¯}
I . This defines an interpretation I
GF = (UGF, JGF)
on GF.
We need to show that for any C ∈ CGH, I |= C if and only if I
GF |= F (C). It suffices
to show that JtKI = JF (t)KIGF for all terms t ∈ TGH. We prove this by induction on t. Since
t is ground, it must be of the form f〈υ¯m〉 s¯l. Then F (t) = f
υ¯m
l (F (s¯l)) and hence
JF (t)KIGF = J
GF(f υ¯ml )(JF (s¯l)KIGF)
IH
= JGF(f υ¯ml )(Js¯lKI) = Jf〈υ¯m〉 s¯lKI = JtKI
using the definition of JGF and Lemma 3.8 for the third step.
Lemma 4.10. The redundancy criterion for GH is a redundancy criterion in the sense of
the framework.
Proof. We must prove conditions (R1) to (R4) defined by Waldmann et al.
(R1) It suffices to show that N \ GHRedC(N) |= N for N ⊆ CGH. Let I be a model of
N \ GHRedC(N). In the extensional variants, let I be extensional. Then by Lemma 4.9,
there exists a model IGH of F (N \GHRedC(N)) = F (N)\GHRedC(F (N)). By Lemma 5.2
of Bachmair and Ganzinger, this is also a model of F (N). By Lemma 4.9, it follows that
I |= N .
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(R2) We must show that N ⊆ N ′ implies that GHRedC(N) ⊆ GHRedC(N
′) and GHRed I(N)
⊆ GHRed I(N
′). By Lemma 5.6(i) of Bachmair and Ganzinger, this holds on GF. For clauses
and all inferences except GArgCong and GExt, this implies that it holds on GH as well
because F is a redundancy-preserving bijection between CGH and CGF and between these
inferences. For GArgCong and GExt inferences, it holds because it holds on clauses.
(R3) We must show that if N ′ ⊆ GHRedC(N), then GHRedC(N) ⊆ GHRedC(N \N
′) and
GHRed I(N) ⊆ GHRed I(N \ N
′). The proof is analogous to (R2), with Lemma 5.6(ii) of
Bachmair and Ganzinger instead of Lemma 5.6(i).
(R4) We must show that for all inferences with concl(ι) ∈ N , we have ι ∈ GHRed I(N).
Since concl(ι) ≺ mprem(ι) for all ι ∈ GFInf , this holds on GF. For all inferences except
GArgCong and GExt, since F is a bijection preserving redundancy, it follows that it also
holds also on GH. For GArgCong and GExt inferences, it holds by definition.
Lemma 4.11. Given a selection function sel on CH, the grounding functions G
gsel for
gsel ∈ G(sel) are grounding functions in the sense of the framework.
Proof. Clearly, C = ⊥ if and only if G(C) = ⊥, proving (G1) and (G2). For (G3), we have
to show for all non-PosExt inferences ι ∈ HInf sel that Ggsel (ι) ⊆ GHRedgselI (G(concl (ι))).
Let ι ∈ HInf sel and ι′ ∈ Ggsel (ι). By the definition of Ggsel , there exists a grounding
substitution θ such that prems(ι′) = prems(ι)θ and concl (ι′) = preconcl (ι)θ. We want to
show that ι′ ∈ GHRed gselI (G(concl (ι))).
If ι′ is not an GArgCong or GExt inference, by the definition of inference redundancy,
it suffices to show that {D ∈ F (G(concl (ι))) | D ≺ mprem(F (ι′))} |= concl(F (ι′)). We
define a substitution θ′ that extends θ to all variables in concl(ι). Due to purification, the
clause concl(ι) may contain variables not present in preconcl (ι). For each such variable x′,
let x be the variable in preconcl (ι) that x′ stems from and define x′θ′ = xθ. Then the
clause F (concl(ι)θ′) differs from the clause F (concl(ι′)) = F (preconcl (ι)θ′) only in some
additional grounded purification literals, which all have the form t 6≈ t and are thus trivially
false in any interpretation. Hence, F (concl(ι)θ′) |= F (concl(ι′)). Since one of the variables
of a purification literal must appear applied in the clause, for each grounded purification
literal t 6≈ t the term t must be smaller than the maximal term of the clause F (concl (ι′)).
If no literals are selected in mprem(F (ι′)), inspection of the rules in GFInf shows that
F (concl (ι)θ′) ≺ mprem(F (ι′)). Otherwise, ι′ can only be an EqRes inference or a Sup
inference into a negative literal. If it is an EqRes inference, due to the selection restrictions,
the substitution σ used in ι is the identity for all variables of functional type. Therefore,
applying σ cannot trigger any purification and hence F (concl(ι)θ′) = F (preconcl (ι)θ′) ≺
mprem(F (ι′)). If ι′ is a Sup inference into a negative literal, due to the selection restrictions,
the substitution σ = mgu(t, u) used in ι is the identity for all variables of functional type
that stem from the main premise. Therefore the variables from the main premise C need
not be purified. The variables from the side premise D might need to be purified, yielding
purification literals of the form x 6≈ y where xθ′ = yθ′. Then x or y must appear applied in
D and hence xθ′ is smaller than tθ′. Again, it follows that F (concl(ι)θ′) ≺ mprem(F (ι′)).
This proves {D ∈ F (G(concl (ι))) | D ≺ mprem(F (ι′))} |= concl(F (ι′)).
In the nonpurifying variants, if ι′ is an GArgCong or GExt inference, it suffices to
show that concl(ι′) ∈ G(concl (ι)). This holds because concl (ι′) = preconcl (ι)θ = concl(ι)θ.
In the purifying variants, if ι′ is an GArgCong or GExt inference, we must show that
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F (G(concl (ι))) |= F (concl (ι′)). Defining θ′ as above, we have F (concl (ι)θ′) |= F (concl (ι′)),
as desired.
Let sel be a selection function on CH fulfilling the selection restrictions introduced in
Section 3.1. Let N ⊆ CH be a clause set saturated w.r.t. HInf
sel and HRed selI . For the
lifting mechanism of the saturation framework to apply, we need to show that there exists a
selection function gsel ∈ G(sel) such that all inferences ι ∈ GHInf gsel with prems(ι) ∈ G(N)
are liftable or redundant. Here, by liftable, we mean that ι is a Ggsel -ground instance of a
HInf sel -inference from N ; by redundant, we mean that ι ∈ GHRed gselI (G(N)).
To choose the right selection function gsel ∈ G(sel), we observe that each ground clause
C ∈ G(N) must have at least one corresponding clause D ∈ N such that C is a ground
instance of D. We choose one of them for each C ∈ G(N), which we denote by G−1(C).
Then let gsel select those literals in C that correspond to the literals selected by sel in
G−1(C). Given this selection function gsel , we can show that all inferences from G(N) are
liftable or redundant.
All non-Sup inferences inGHInf are liftable (Lemma 4.13). For Sup, some inferences are
liftable (Lemma 4.14) and some are redundant (Lemma 4.15). As in standard superposition,
Sup inferences into positions below variables are redundant. The variable condition of each
of the four calculi is designed to cover the nonredundant Sup inferences into positions of
variables or applied variables, which makes these inferences liftable.
Lemma 4.12. Let σ be the most general unifier of s and s′. Let θ be an arbitrary unifier
of s and s′. Then σθ = θ.
Proof. Like in first-order logic, we can assume that σ is idempotent without loss of generality
[34, Corollary 7.2.11]. Since σ is most general, there exists a substitution ρ such that σρ = θ.
Therefore, by idempotence, σθ = σσρ = σρ = θ.
Lemma 4.13 (Lifting of EqRes, EqFact, GArgCong, and GExt). All EqRes, Eq-
Fact, GArgCong, and GExt inferences are liftable.
Proof. EqRes: Let ι ∈ GHInf gsel be an EqRes inference with prems(ι) ∈ G(N). Then ι is
of the form
Cθ = C ′θ ∨ sθ 6≈ s′θ
EqRes
C ′θ
where G−1(Cθ) = C = C ′ ∨ s 6≈ s′ and the literal sθ 6≈ s′θ is eligible w.r.t. gsel . Let
σ = mgu(s, s′). It follows that s 6≈ s′ is eligible in C w.r.t. σ and sel . Moreover, sθ and s′θ
are unifiable and ground, and therefore sθ = s′θ. Thus, the following inference ι′ ∈ HInf sel
is applicable:
C ′ ∨ s 6≈ s′
EqRes
pure(C ′σ)
(where pure is the identity in nonpurifying variants). By Lemma 4.12, we have C ′σθ = C ′θ.
Therefore, ι is the θ-ground instance of ι′ and is therefore liftable.
EqFact: Analogously, if ι ∈ GHInf gsel is an EqFact inference with prems(ι) ∈ G(N),
then ι is of the form
Cθ = C ′θ ∨ s′θ ≈ t′θ ∨ sθ ≈ tθ
EqFact
C ′θ ∨ tθ 6≈ t′θ ∨ sθ ≈ t′θ
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where G−1(Cθ) = C = C ′ ∨ s′ ≈ t′ ∨ s ≈ t, the literal sθ ≈ tθ is eligible in C w.r.t. gsel ,
and sθ 6≺ tθ. Let σ = mgu(s, s′). Hence, s ≈ t is eligible in C w.r.t. σ and sel . We have
s 6≺ t. Moreover, sθ and s′θ are unifiable and ground. Hence, sθ = s′θ. Thus, the following
inference ι′ ∈ HInf sel is applicable:
C ′ ∨ s′ ≈ t′ ∨ s ≈ t
EqFact
pure((C ′ ∨ t 6≈ t′ ∨ s ≈ t′)σ)
By Lemma 4.12, we have preconcl (ι′)θ = concl(ι). Hence, ι is the θ-ground instance of ι′
and is therefore liftable.
GArgCong: Let ι ∈ GHInf gsel be a GArgCong inference with prems(ι) ∈ G(N). Then
ι is of the form
Cθ = C ′θ ∨ sθ ≈ s′θ
GArgCong
C ′θ ∨ sθ u¯n ≈ s
′θ u¯n
where G−1(Cθ) = C = C ′ ∨ s ≈ s′, the literal sθ ≈ s′θ is strictly eligible w.r.t. gsel , and
sθ and s′θ are of functional type. It follows that s and s′ have either a functional or a
polymorphic type. Let σ be the most general substitution such that sσ and s′σ take n
arguments. Then s 6≈ s′ is eligible in C w.r.t. σ and sel . Hence the following inference
ι′ ∈ HInf sel is applicable:
C ′ ∨ s ≈ s′
ArgCong
pure((C ′ ∨ s x¯n ≈ s
′ x¯n)σ)
Then ι is a ground instance of ι′ and is therefore liftable.
GExt: The conclusion of a GExt inference in GHInf is by definition a ground instance of
the conclusion of the Ext inference in HInf before purification. Hence, the GExt inference
is a ground instance of the Ext inference. Therefore it is liftable.
Lemma 4.14 (Lifting of Sup). Let ι ∈ GHInf gsel be a Sup inference
D′θ ∨ tθ ≈ t′θ C ′θ ∨ [¬] sθ tθ p ≈ s
′θ
Sup
D′θ ∨ C ′θ ∨ [¬] sθ t′θ p ≈ s
′θ
where G−1(Dθ) = D = D′ ∨ t ≈ t′ and G−1(Cθ) = C = C ′ ∨ [¬] s ≈ s′. Suppose that the
position p exists as a green subterm in s. Let u be the green subterm of s at that position
and σ = mgu(t, u) (which exists since θ is a unifier). If the variable condition holds for C, t,
t′, u, and σ, then ι is liftable.
Proof. The inference conditions of ι can be lifted to D and C. That tθ ≈ t′θ is strictly
eligible in Dθ w.r.t. gsel implies that t ≈ t′ is strictly eligible in D w.r.t. σ and sel . If
[¬] sθ ≈ s′θ is (strictly) eligible in Cθ w.r.t. gsel , then [¬] s ≈ s′ is (strictly) eligible in C
w.r.t. σ and sel . Moreover, Dθ 6 Cθ implies D 6 C, tθ 6≺ t′θ implies t 6≺ t′, and sθ 6≺ s′θ
implies s 6≺ s′.
By assumption, p is a position of s and the variable condition holds. Thus, the following
inference ι′ ∈ HInf sel is applicable:
D′ ∨ t ≈ t′ C ′ ∨ [¬] s u p ≈ s
′
Sup
pure((D′ ∨ C ′ ∨ [¬] s t′ p ≈ s
′)σ)
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By Lemma 4.12, we have (preconcl (ι′))θ = concl(ι). Hence, ι is the θ-ground instance of ι′
and is therefore liftable.
The other Sup inferences might not be liftable, but they are redundant:
Lemma 4.15. Let ι ∈ GHInf gsel be a Sup inference
D′θ ∨ tθ ≈ t′θ C ′θ ∨ [¬] sθ tθ p ≈ s
′θ
Sup
D′θ ∨ C ′θ ∨ [¬] sθ t′θ p ≈ s
′θ
where G−1(Dθ) = D = D′ ∨ t ≈ t′ and G−1(Cθ) = C = C ′ ∨ [¬] s ≈ s′. Suppose that
Lemma 4.14 does not apply. This could be either because the position p is below a variable
in s or because the variable condition holds does not hold. Then ι ∈ GHRed gselI (G(N)).
Proof. By the definition of GHRed I, to show ι ∈ GHRed
gsel
I (G(N)), it suffices to prove
that {E ∈ F (G(N)) | E ≺ F (Cθ)} |= F (concl(ι)). Let I be a first-order model of all
E ∈ F (G(N)) with E ≺ F (Cθ). We must show that I |= F (concl(ι)). If I |= F (D′θ), this
is obvious. So we further assume that I 6|= F (D′θ). Since Dθ ≺ Cθ by the Sup inference
conditions, it follows that I |= F (tθ ≈ t′θ). By congruence, it suffices to show I |= F (Cθ).
We proceed by a case distinction on the two possible reasons why Lemma 4.14 does not
apply:
Case 1: The position p is below a variable in s. Then tθ is a proper green subterm of xθ
and hence a green subterm of xθ w¯ for any arguments w¯. Let v be the term that we obtain
by replacing tθ by t′θ in xθ at the relevant position. It follows from our assumptions about I
that I |= F (tθ ≈ t′θ), and by congruence, I |= F (xθ w¯ ≈ v w¯) for any arguments w¯. Hence,
I |= F (Cθ) if and only if I |= F (C{x 7→ v}θ). By the inference conditions we have tθ ≻ t′θ,
which implies F (Cθ) ≻ F (C{x 7→ v}θ) by compatibility with green contexts. Therefore, we
have I |= F (C{x 7→ v}θ) and hence I |= F (Cθ).
Case 2: The variable condition does not hold. In the extensional variants, it follows that u
has a variable head and jells with t ≈ t′. By Definition 3.1, this means that u, t, and t′ have
the following form: u = x v¯n for some variable x and a tuple of terms v¯n of length n ≥ 0;
t = t˜ x¯n and t
′ = t˜ ′ x¯n, where x¯n are variables that do not occur elsewhere in D.
For the intensional variants, we have u ∈ V . Thus, u, t, and t′ can be written in the
same form as described above for the extensional variants, with n = 0.
Case 2.1 (Purifying calculi): First, we assume that x occurs only with arguments v¯n
in C. For the intensional variant, this must be the case because n = 0 and hence x can
only occur without arguments by the definition of pure and the literal selection restriction.
Define a substitution θ′ by xθ′ = t˜ ′θ and yθ′ = yθ for other variables y. Since tθ ≻ t′θ by
the inference conditions, we have Cθ ≻ Cθ′. Moreover, Cθ′ ∈ G(N). Then I |= F (Cθ) by
congruence, because I |= F (Cθ′) and I |= F (tθ ≈ t′θ).
Now we assume that x occurs with arguments other than v¯n in C. This can only happen
in the extensional variant and by the selection restrictions, [¬] sθ ≈ s′θ may not be selected
in Cθ. Therefore, sθ is the maximal term in Cθ. Then s 6= x and hence v¯n 6= ε because
otherwise sθ = xθ would be smaller than the applied occurrence of xθ in Cθ.
Define a substitution θ′′ such that xθ′′ = t˜ ′θ, yθ′′ = t˜ ′θ for other variables y if yθ = sθ
and C contains the literal x 6≈ y, and yθ′′ = yθ otherwise.
We show that Cθ ≻ Cθ′′ by proving that no literal of Cθ′′ is larger than the maximal
literal [¬] sθ ≈ s′θ of Cθ and that [¬] sθ ≈ s′θ appears more often in Cθ than in Cθ′′.
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For a literal of the form x 6≈ y, we have xθ′′ ≺ sθ and yθ′′ ≺ sθ. For literals that
are not of this form, by the definition of pure in the extensional variant, x occurs always
with arguments v¯n. Hence these literals are equal or smaller in Cθ
′′ than in Cθ, because
xθ′′ v¯n ≺ xθ v¯n and yθ
′′  yθ. Therefore, no literal of Cθ′′ is larger than the maximal literal
[¬] sθ ≈ s′θ of Cθ. Moreover, these inequalities show that every occurrence of [¬] sθ ≈ s′θ
in Cθ′′ corresponds to an occurrence of [¬] sθ ≈ s′θ in Cθ that corresponds to a literal in C
without the variable x. Since at least one occurrence of [¬] sθ ≈ s′θ in Cθ corresponds to a
literal in C containing x, [¬] sθ ≈ s′θ appears more often in Cθ than in Cθ′′. This concludes
the argument that Cθ ≻ Cθ′′. It follows that I |= F (Cθ′′).
We need to show that I |= F (Cθ). There is a PosExt inference from D to D′ ∨ t˜ ≈ t˜ ′.
This inference is in HRed I(N) because N is saturated. Therefore, D
′θ ∨ t˜θ ≈ t˜ ′θ is in
G(N) ∪ GHRedC(G(N)). It follows that I |= F (D′θ ∨ t˜θ ≈ t˜ ′θ) because this clause is
smaller than F (D′θ) and hence smaller than F (Cθ). Since F (D′θ) is false in I , we have
I |= F (t˜θ ≈ t˜ ′θ).
For every literal of the form x 6≈ y, where yθ = sθ, the variable y can only occur
without arguments in C because of the maximality of sθ. We distinguish two cases. If for
every literal of the form x 6≈ y where yθ = sθ, we have I |= F (yθ′′ ≈ yθ), then I |= F (Cθ) by
congruence. If for some literal of the form x 6≈ y where yθ = sθ, we have I |= F (yθ′′ 6≈ yθ),
then I |= F (yθ 6≈ xθ) because yθ′′ = t˜ ′θ, I |= F (t˜ ′θ ≈ t˜θ), and t˜θ = xθ. Hence a literal of
F (Cθ) is true in I and therefore I |= Cθ.
Case 2.2 (Nonpurifying calculi): Since the variable condition does not hold, we have
Cθ  C ′′θ, where C ′′ = C{x 7→ t˜ ′}. We cannot have Cθ = C ′′θ because xθ = t˜θ 6= t˜ ′θ and
x occurs in C. Hence, we have Cθ ≻ C ′′θ.
By the definition of I , Cθ ≻ C ′′θ implies I |= F (C ′′θ). We will use equalities that are
true in I to rewrite F (Cθ) into F (C ′′θ), which implies I |= F (Cθ) by congruence.
By saturation ofN , for any well-typedm-tuple of fresh variables z¯, we can use a PosExt
with premise D (if n > m) or ArgCong inference with premise D (if n < m) or using D
itself (if n = m) to show that G(D′ ∨ t˜ z¯ ≈ t˜ ′ z¯) ⊆ G(N) ∪ GHRedC(G(N)). Hence,
D′θ ∨ t˜θ u¯ ≈ t˜ ′θ u¯ is in G(N) ∪GHRedC(G(N)) for any ground arguments u¯.
We observe that whenever t˜θ u¯ and t˜ ′θ u¯ are smaller than the maximal term of Cθ for
some arguments u¯, we have
I |= F (t˜θ u¯) ≈ F (t˜ ′θ u¯) (†)
To show this, we assume that t˜θ u¯ and t˜ ′θ u¯ are smaller than the maximal term of Cθ
and we distinguish two cases: If tθ is smaller than the maximal term of Cθ, all terms in
D′θ are smaller than the maximal term of Cθ and hence D′θ ∨ t˜θ u¯ ≈ t˜ ′θ u¯ ≺ Cθ. If, on
the other hand, tθ is equal to the maximal term of Cθ, t˜θ u¯ and t˜ ′θ u¯ are smaller than tθ.
Hence t˜θ u¯ ≈ t˜ ′θ u¯ ≺ tθ ≈ t′θ and D′θ ∨ t˜θ u¯ ≈ t˜ ′θ u¯ ≺ Dθ ≺ Cθ. In both cases, since
F (D′θ) is false in I by assumption, I |= F (t˜θ u¯) ≈ F (t˜ ′θ u¯).
We proceed by a case distinction on whether sθ appears in a selected or in a maximal
literal of Cθ. In both cases we provide an algorithm that establishes the equivalence of Cθ
and C ′′θ via rewriting using (†). This might seem trivial at first sight, but we can only use
the equations (†) if t˜θ u¯ and t˜ ′θ u¯ are smaller than the maximal term of Cθ. Moreover, u¯
might itself contain positions where we want to rewrite, so the order of rewriting matters.
Case 2.2.1: sθ is the maximal side of a maximal literal of Cθ. Then, since Cθ ≻ C ′′θ, every
term in Cθ and in C ′′θ is smaller than or equal to sθ. Let C0 and C˜0 be the clauses resulting
23
from rewriting F (tθ)→ F (t′θ) wherever possible in F (Cθ) and F (C ′′θ), respectively. Since
F (tθ) is a subterm of F (sθ), now every term in C0 and C˜0 is strictly smaller than F (sθ).
We define C1, C2, . . . inductively as follows: Given Ci, choose a subterm of the form
F (t˜θ u¯) where t˜θ u¯ ≻ t˜ ′θ u¯ or of the form F (t˜ ′θ u¯) where t˜ ′θ u¯ ≻ t˜θ u¯. Let Ci+1 be the
clause resulting from rewriting that subterm F (t˜θ u¯) to F (t˜ ′θ u¯) or that subterm F (t˜ ′θ u¯)
to F (t˜θ u¯) in Ci, depending on which term was chosen. Analogously, we define C˜1, C˜2, . . . by
applying the same algorithm to C˜0. In both cases, the process terminates because ≻ is com-
patible with green contexts and well founded. Let C∗ and C˜∗ be the respective final clauses.
The algorithm preserves the invariant that every term in Ci and C˜i is strictly smaller
than sθ. By congruence via (†), applied at every step of the algorithm, we know that C∗
and F (Cθ) are equivalent in I and that C˜∗ and F (C
′′θ) are equivalent in I as well.
We show that C∗ = C˜∗. Assume that C∗ 6= C˜∗. The algorithm preserves a second invari-
ant, namely that F −1(Ci) and F
−1(C˜j) are equal except for positions where one contains
t˜θ and the other one contains t˜ ′θ. Consider a deepest position where F −1(C∗) and F
−1(C˜∗)
are different. The respective position in C∗ and C˜∗ then contains F (t˜θ u¯) and F (t˜
′θ u¯) or
vice versa. The arguments u¯ must be equal because we consider a deepest position. But
then t˜θ u¯ ≻ t˜ ′θ u¯ or t˜θ u¯ ≺ t˜ ′θ u¯, which is impossible since the algorithm terminated in C∗
and C˜∗. This shows that C∗ = C˜∗. Hence F (Cθ) and F (C
′′θ) are equivalent, which proves
I |= F (Cθ).
Case 2.2.2: sθ is the maximal side of a selected literal of Cθ. Then, by the selection
restrictions, x cannot be the head of a maximal literal of C.
At every position where x u¯ occurs in C with some (or no) arguments u¯, we rewrite
(t˜ u¯)θ to (t˜ ′ u¯)θ in Cθ if (t˜ u¯)θ ≻ (t˜ ′ u¯)θ. We start with the innermost occurrences of x, so
that the order of the two terms at one step does not change by later rewriting. Analogously,
at every position where x u¯ occurs in C with some (or no) arguments u¯, we rewrite (t˜ ′ u¯)θ
to (t˜ u¯)θ in C ′′θ if (t˜ ′ u¯)θ ≻ (t˜ u¯)θ, again starting with the innermost occurrences.
We never rewrite at the top level of the maximal term of Cθ or C ′′θ because x cannot
be the head of a maximal literal of C. The two resulting clauses are identical because Cθ
and C ′′θ only differ at positions where x occurs in C. The rewritten terms are all smaller
than the maximal term of Cθ. With (†), this implies that I |= F (Cθ) by congruence.
With these properties of our inference systems in place, the saturation framework guar-
antees static and dynamic refutational completeness of HInf sel w.r.t. HRed selI . However, the
framework gives us refutational completeness w.r.t. the Herbrand entailment |=G , defined
as N1 |=G N2 if G(N1) |= G(N2), whereas our semantics is Tarski entailment |=, defined as
N1 |= N2 if any model of N1 is a model of N2. The following lemma repairs this mismatch:
Lemma 4.16. For N ⊆ CH, we have N |=G ⊥ if and only if N |= ⊥.
Proof. By Lemma 3.9, any model of N is also a model of G(N)—i.e., N 6|= ⊥ implies
N 6|=G ⊥. For the other direction, we need to show that N 6|=G ⊥ implies N 6|= ⊥. Assume
that N 6|=G ⊥—i.e., G(N) 6|= ⊥. Then there is a model I of G(N). We must show that there
exists a model of N—i.e., N 6|= ⊥. Let I ′ be an interpretation derived from I by removing
all universes that are not the denotation of a type in Ty
GH
and removing all domain elements
that are not the denotation of a term in TGH, making I
′ term-generated. Clearly, in our
clausal logic, this leaves the denotations of terms and the truth of clauses unchanged. Thus,
I ′ |= G(N). We will show that I ′ |= N . Let C ∈ N . We want to show that C is true in
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I ′ for all valuations ξ. Fix a valuation ξ. By construction, for each variable x, there exists
a ground term sx such that JsxKI′ = ξ(x). Let ρ be the substitution that maps every free
variable x in C to sx. Then ξ(x) = JsxKI′ = JxρKI′ for all x. By treating the type variables
of C in the same way, we can also achieve that ξ(α) = JαρKI′ for all x. By Lemma 3.8,
JtρKI′ = JtK
ξ
I′ for all terms t and JτρKI′ = JτK
ξ
I′ for all types τ . Hence, Cρ and C have the
same truth value in I ′ for ξ. Since I ′ |= G(N), Cρ is true in I ′ and thus C is true in I ′ as
well.
Theorem 4.17 (Static refutational completeness). Let N ⊆ CH be a clause set saturated
w.r.t. HInf sel and HRed selI . Then N |= ⊥ if and only if ⊥ ∈ N .
Proof. We apply Theorem 14 of Waldmann et al. We take H for F, GH for G, and F (sel)
for Q. It is easy to see that the entailment relation |= on GH is a consequence relation in the
sense of the framework. By Lemma 4.10 and 4.11, (GHRed gselI ,GHRedC) is a redundancy
criterion in the sense of the framework, and Ggsel are grounding functions in the sense of the
framework, for all gsel ∈ F (sel). The redundancy criterion (HRed selI ,HRedC) matches ex-
actly the intersected lifted redundancy criterion Red∩,= of Waldmann et al. By Theorem 4.8,
GHInf gsel is statically refutationally complete for all gsel ∈ F (sel). By Lemmas 4.13, 4.14,
and 4.15, for every saturated N ⊆ CH, there exists a selection function gsel ∈ G(sel) such
that all inferences ι ∈ GHInf gsel with prems(ι) ∈ G(N) either are Ggsel -ground instances of
HInf sel -inferences from N or belong to GHRed gselI (G(N)).
If = = ∅, Theorem 14 of Waldmann et al. implies that if N ⊆ CH is a clause set
saturated w.r.t. HInf sel and HRed selI , then N |=G ⊥ if and only if ⊥ ∈ N . By Lemma 16 of
Waldmann et al., this also holds if = 6= ∅. By Lemma 4.16, this also holds for the Tarski
entailment |=. That is, if N ⊆ CH is a clause set saturated w.r.t. HInf
sel and HRed selI , then
N |= ⊥ if and only if ⊥ ∈ N .
From static refutational completeness, we can easily derive dynamic refutational com-
pleteness. Let (Ni)i be a (finite or infinite) sequence over sets of clauses from CH. Such a
sequence is called a derivation if Ni \Ni+1 ⊆ HRedC(Ni+1) for all i. It is called fair if all
HInf -inferences from clauses in
⋃
i
⋂
j≥iNj are contained in
⋃
iHRed I(Ni).
Theorem 4.18 (Dynamic refutational completeness). For every fair derivation (Ni)i such
that N0 |= {⊥}, we have ⊥ ∈ Ni for some i.
Proof. By Theorem 17 of Waldmann et al., this follows from Theorem 4.17 and Lemma 4.16.
5. Implementation
Zipperposition [28, 29] is an open source superposition-based theorem prover written in
OCaml.1 It was initially designed for polymorphic first-order logic with equality, as embodied
by TPTP TF1 [19]. We will refer to this implementation as Zipperposition’s first-order mode.
Later, Cruanes extended the prover with a pragmatic higher-order mode with support for
λ-abstractions and extensionality, without any completeness guarantees. We have now also
implemented complete clausal λ-free higher-order modes based on the four calculi described
in this article.
1https://github.com/sneeuwballen/zipperposition
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The pragmatic higher-order mode provided a convenient basis to implement our calculi.
It employs higher-order term and type representations and orders. Its ad hoc calculus
extensions are similar to our calculi. They include an ArgCong-like rule and a PosExt-
like rule, and Sup inferences are performed only at green subterms. One of the bugs we found
during our implementation work occurred because argument positions shift when applied
variables are instantiated. We resolved this by numbering argument positions in terms from
right to left.
To implement the λ-free higher-order mode, we restricted the unification algorithm to
non-λ-abstractions. To satisfy the requirements on selection, we avoid selecting literals
that contain higher-order variables. To comply with our redundancy notion, we disabled
rewriting of non-green subterms. Finally, to improve term indexing of higher-order terms,
we replaced the imperfect discrimination trees by fingerprint indices [55].
For the purifying calculi, we implemented purification as a simplification rule. This
ensures that it is applied aggressively on all clauses, whether initial clauses from the problem
or clauses produced during saturation, before any inferences are performed.
For the nonpurifying calculi, we added the possibility to perform Sup inferences at
variable positions. This means that variables must be indexed as well. In addition, we
modified the variable condition. However, it is in general impossible to decide whether there
exists a ground substitution θ with tσθ ≻ t′σθ and Cσθ ≺ C ′′σθ. We overapproximate the
condition as follows: (1) check whether x appears with different arguments in the clause C;
(2) use an term-order-specific algorithm to determine whether there might exist a grounding
substitution θ and terms u¯ such that tσθ ≻ t′σθ and tσθ u¯ ≺ t′σθ u¯; and (3) check whether
Cσ 6 C ′′σ. If these three conditions apply, we conclude that there might exist a ground
substitution θ witnessing nonmonotonicity.
For the extensional calculi, we add axiom (Ext) to the clause set. To curb the explosion
associated with extensionality, this axiom and all clauses derived from it are penalized by
the clause selection heuristic. We also added the NegExt rule described in Section 3.2,
which resembles Vampire’s extensionality resolution rule [37].
The ArgCong rule can have infinitely many conclusions on polymorphic clauses. To
capture this in the implementation, we store these infinite sequences of conclusions in the
form of finite instructions of how to obtain the actual clauses. In addition to the usual
active and passive set of the DISCOUNT loop architecture [3], we use a set of scheduled
inferences that stores these instructions. We visit the scheduled inferences in this additional
set and the clauses in the passive set fairly to achieve dynamic completeness of our prover
architecture. Waldmann et al. [66, Example 34] and Bentkamp et al. [9, Section 6] describe
this architecture in more detail.
Using Zipperposition, we can quantify the disadvantage of the applicative encoding on
Example 3.7. A well-chosen KBO instance with argument coefficients allows Zipperposition
to derive ⊥ in 4 iterations of the prover’s main loop and 0.03 s. KBO or LPO with default
settings needs 203 iterations and 0.4 s, whereas KBO or LPO on the applicatively encoded
problem needs 203 iterations and more than 1 s due to the larger terms.
6. Evaluation
We evaluated Zipperposition’s implementation of our four calculi on Sledgehammer-generated
Isabelle/HOL benchmarks [23] and on benchmarks from the TPTP library [62,63]. We com-
pare our calculi with an applicative encoding mode, which performs the applicative encoding
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after the clausal normal form transformation and then proceeds with Zipperposition’s first-
order mode. The encoding makes all function symbols nullary and replaces all applications
with a polymorphic binary app symbol.
Our experimental data is available online.2 We used the development version of Zip-
perposition, revision 2031e216.3 Since the present work is only a stepping stone towards
a prover for full higher-order logic, it would be misleading to compare this prototype with
state-of-the-art higher-order provers that support a stronger logic. Many of the higher-order
problems in the TPTP library are in fact satisfiable for our λ-free logic, even though they
may be unsatisfiable for full higher-order logic and labeled as such in the TPTP.
We instantiated all calculus variants with three different term orders: LPO [20], KBO [6]
(without argument coefficients), and EPO [8]. Among these, LPO is the only nonmonotonic
order and therefore the most relevant option to evaluate our calculi, which are designed
to cope with nonmonotonicity. KBO and EPO provide a yardstick to assess the cost of
nonmonotonicity. However, when using a monotonic order, it may be more efficient to
superpose at non-argument subterms directly instead of relying on the ArgCong rule.
The Sledgehammer benchmarks, corresponding to Isabelle’s Judgment Day suite, were
regenerated to target clausal λ-free higher-order logic. They comprise 2506 problems in
total, divided in two groups based on the number of Isabelle facts (lemmas, definitions, etc.)
selected for inclusion in each problem: either 16 facts (SH16) or 256 facts (SH256). The
problems were generated by encoding λ-expressions as λ-lifted supercombinators [47].
From the TPTP library, we collected 708 first-order problems in TFF format and 717
higher-order problems in THF format, both groups containing both monomorphic and poly-
morphic problems. We excluded all problems that contain interpreted arithmetic symbols,
the symbols (@@+), (@@-), (@+), (@-), (&), or tuples, as well as the SYN000 problems, which
are only intended to test the parser, and problems whose clausal normal form takes longer
than 15 s to compute or falls outside the λ-free fragment described in Section 2.
Figure 1 summarizes, for the intensional calculi, the number of solved satisfiable and
unsatisfiable problems within 180 s, and the time taken to show unsatisfiability. Figure 2
presents the corresponding data for the extensional calculi. The average time is computed
over the problems that all configurations for the respective benchmark set and term order
found to be unsatisfiable within the time limit. For each combination of benchmark set
and term order, the best result is highlighted in bold. The evaluation was carried out on
StarExec Iowa [60] using Intel Xeon E5-2609 0 CPUs clocked at 2.40GHz.
The experimental results on the TFF part of the TPTP library confirm that our calculi
handle the vast majority of problems that are solvable in first-order mode gracefully. On
first-order problems, the calculi are occasionally at variance with the first-order mode, due
to the interaction of ArgCong with polymorphic types and due to the extensionality axiom
(Ext). In contrast, the applicative encoding is comparatively inefficient on problems that
are already first-order. For LPO, the success rate drops by about 15%, and the average time
to show unsatisfiability triples.
The SH16 benchmarks consist mostly of small, mildly higher-order problems. The small
number of axioms benefits the applicative encoding enough to outperform the purifying
variants but not the nonpurifying ones. The SH256 benchmarks are also mildly higher-order
but much larger. Such problems are underrepresented in the TPTP library. On these, our
2http://matryoshka.gforge.inria.fr/pubs/lfhosup_article_data/
3https://github.com/sneeuwballen/zipperposition/tree/2031e216c1941acd76187882a073e8f1e533
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# sat # unsat  time
LPO KBO EPO LPO KBO EPO LPO KBO EPO
SH16 applicative encoding 111 189 65 373 382 157 0.9 1.2 10.7
nonpurifying calculus 136 165 133 383 385 381 0.4 0.3 0.0
purifying calculus 82 98 82 363 363 355 1.3 2.0 0.0
SH256 applicative encoding 1 1 1 471 488 36 9.4 8.7 63.8
nonpurifying calculus 1 1 1 543 554 498 2.3 2.3 0.1
purifying calculus 1 1 1 523 528 484 2.6 3.4 0.5
TFF first-order mode 0 0 0 212 229 107 1.9 2.3 1.5
applicative encoding 0 0 0 180 205 21 7.0 10.0 4.6
nonpurifying calculus 0 0 0 210 229 105 1.9 2.4 1.5
purifying calculus 0 0 0 211 229 105 2.1 2.6 1.6
THF applicative encoding 127 115 111 523 522 428 0.9 0.6 0.8
nonpurifying calculus 111 114 112 529 527 516 0.3 0.3 0.0
purifying calculus 108 109 108 528 526 514 0.3 0.5 0.0
Figure 1. Evaluation of the intensional calculi
# sat # unsat  time
LPO KBO EPO LPO KBO EPO LPO KBO EPO
SH16 applicative encoding 79 152 48 379 386 157 1.2 1.3 11.4
nonpurifying calculus 103 131 95 386 393 387 0.4 0.1 0.0
purifying calculus 32 57 32 367 365 363 2.0 1.7 0.0
SH256 applicative encoding 1 1 1 462 486 36 7.5 9.4 63.8
nonpurifying calculus 1 1 1 548 572 504 1.9 2.1 0.1
purifying calculus 1 1 1 512 529 482 2.2 5.0 0.1
TFF first-order mode 0 0 0 212 229 107 1.9 2.5 1.5
applicative encoding 0 0 0 178 202 21 7.9 11.7 4.7
nonpurifying calculus 0 0 0 207 229 106 2.1 3.0 1.5
purifying calculus 0 0 0 210 229 105 2.2 3.2 1.6
THF applicative encoding 108 109 105 526 527 436 0.9 0.6 1.1
nonpurifying calculus 106 108 107 539 535 526 0.3 0.3 0.0
purifying calculus 96 97 96 530 529 519 0.3 0.6 0.0
Figure 2. Evaluation of the extensional calculi
calculi clearly outperform the applicative encoding. This is hardly surprising given that the
proving effort is dominated by first-order reasoning, which they can perform gracefully.
The THF benchmarks generally require more sophisticated higher-order reasoning than
the Sledgehammer benchmarks. On the THF set, the results are less clear. The applicative
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encoding and our calculi are roughly neck-and-neck. The nonpurifying variants detect un-
satisfiability slightly more frequently, whereas the applicative encoding tends to find more
saturations. It seems that, due to the large amount of higher-order reasoning necessary to
solve TPTP problems, the advantage of our calculi on the first-order parts of the derivation
is not a decisive factor on these benchmarks. Across all benchmarks, the nonpurifying calculi
outperform their purifying relatives.
KBO tends to have a slight advantage over LPO on all benchmark sets. But the gap
between KBO and LPO is not larger on the higher-order benchmarks than on TFF. Since
LPO is monotonic on first-order terms but nonmonotonic on higher-order terms, whereas
KBO is monotonic on both, this suggests that there is no substantial cost associated with
nonmonotonicity. EPO generally performs worse than the other two orders, with the ex-
ception of the nonpurifying variant on SH16 benchmarks, where it is roughly neck-and-neck
with RPO. This suggests that for small, mildly higher-order problems, EPO can be a viable
RPO-like complement to KBO if one considers the effort to implement our calculi too high.
7. Discussion and Related Work
Our calculi join a long list of extensions and refinements of superposition. Among the most
closely related is Peltier’s [51] Isabelle/HOL formalization of the refutational completeness of
a superposition calculus that operates on λ-free higher-order terms and that is parameterized
by a monotonic term order. Extensions with polymorphism and induction, independently
developed by Cruanes [28, 29] and Wand [67], contribute to increasing the power of auto-
matic provers. Detection of inconsistencies in axioms, as suggested by Schulz et al. [57], is
important for large axiomatizations.
Also of interest is Bofill and Rubio’s [22] integration of nonmonotonic orders in ordered
paramodulation, a precursor of superposition. Their work is a veritable tour de force, but it
is also highly complicated and restricted to ordered paramodulation. Lack of compatibility
with arguments being a mild form of nonmonotonicity, it seemed preferable to start with
superposition, enrich it with an ArgCong rule, and tune the side conditions until we
obtained a complete calculus.
Most complications can be avoided by using a monotonic order such as KBO without
argument coefficients. However, coefficients can be useful to help achieve compatibility
with β-reduction. For example, the term λx. x + x could be treated as a constant with a
coefficient of 2 on its argument and a heavy weight to ensure (λx. x+x) y ≻ y+y. Although
they do not use argument coefficients, the recently developed λ-superposition calculus by
Bentkamp et al. [10] and combinatory superposition calculus by Bhayat and Reger [16] need
a nonmonotonic order to cope with β-reduction. They are modeled after our extensional
nonpurifying and intensional nonpurifying calculi, respectively.
Many researchers have proposed or used encodings of higher-order logic constructs into
first-order logic, including Robinson [53], Kerber [42], Dougherty [32], Dowek et al. [33],
Hurd [41], Meng and Paulson [47], Obermeyer [50], and Czajka [30]. Encodings of types,
such as those by Bobot and Paskevich [21] and Blanchette et al. [17], are also crucial to obtain
a sound encoding of higher-order logic. These ideas are implemented in proof assistant tools
such as HOLyHammer and Sledgehammer [18].
In the term rewriting community, λ-free higher-order logic is known as applicative first-
order logic. First-order rewrite techniques can be applied to this logic via the applicative
encoding. However, there are similar drawbacks as in theorem proving to having app as
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the only nonnullary symbol. Hirokawa et al. [39] propose a technique that resembles our
mapping F to avoid these drawbacks.
Another line of research has focused on the development of automated proof procedures
for higher-order logic. Robinson’s [52], Andrews’s [1], and Huet’s [40] pioneering work stands
out. Andrews [2] and Benzmüller and Miller [12] provide excellent surveys. The competitive
higher-order automatic theorem provers include Leo-II [13] (based on RUE resolution),
Satallax [25] (based on a tableau calculus and a SAT solver), agsyHOL [46] (based on a
focused sequent calculus and a generic narrowing engine), Leo-III [59] (based on a pragmatic
higher-order version of ordered paramodulation with no completeness guarantees), CVC4
and veriT [5] (both based on satisfiability modulo theories), and Vampire [15,16] (based on
superposition and SK-style combinators). The Isabelle proof assistant [49] (which includes
a tableau reasoner and a rewriting engine) and its Sledgehammer subsystem also participate
in the higher-order division of the CADE ATP System Competition [61].
Zipperposition is a convenient vehicle for experimenting and prototyping because it is
easier to understand and modify than highly-optimized C or C++ provers. Our middle-
term goal is to design higher-order superposition calculi, implement them in state-of-the-art
provers such as E [56], SPASS [68], and Vampire [44], and integrate these in proof assistants
to provide a high level of automation. With its stratified architecture, Otter-λ [7] is perhaps
the closest to what we are aiming at, but it is limited to second-order logic and offers no
completeness guarantees. As a first step, Vukmirović, Blanchette, Cruanes, and Schulz [65]
have generalized E’s data structures and algorithms to clausal λ-free higher-order logic,
assuming a monotonic KBO [6].
8. Conclusion
We presented four superposition calculi for intensional and extensional clausal λ-free higher-
order logic and proved them refutationally complete. The calculi nicely generalize standard
superposition and are compatible with our λ-free higher-order LPO and KBO. Especially
on large problems, our experiments confirm what one would naturally expect: that native
support for partial application and applied variables outperforms the applicative encoding.
The new calculi reduce the gap between proof assistants based on higher-order logic and
superposition provers. We can use them to reason about arbitrary higher-order problems by
axiomatizing suitable combinators. But perhaps more importantly, they appear promising as
a stepping stone towards complete, highly efficient automatic theorem provers for full higher-
order logic. Indeed, the subsequent work by Bentkamp et al. [10], which introduces support
for λ-expressions, and Bhayat and Reger [16], which works with SK-style combinators, is
largely based on our nonpurifying calculi.
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